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In order to steer through a world characterized by a complex mixture of
variability and structure, organisms rely upon implicit statistical learning, the
capability to extract probabalistic patterns occurring in environmental stimuli.
Although statistical learning has been found to occur across a myriad of
domains, there has been little investigation into the effect that sense modality
and other stimulus attributes may have on learning. In a series of experiments,
I investigate to what extent implicit statistical learning is constrained and
influenced by the nature of the input in which the statistical regularities occur.
All experiments have in common the use of artificial grammar learning
methodology, where adult participants are incidentally exposed to
statistically-governed patterns and then are tested on their ability to apply
their acquired knowledge to novel instances. Chapter 2 presents two
experiments that compared learning across touch, vision, and audition,
producing evidence for modality constraints. Specifically, the auditory
modality displayed a quantitative learning advantage compared to vision and
touch; additionally, each sense modality was more or less attuned to specific
aspects of the input. Chapter 3 describes an experiment that further explored
modality constraints by manipulating both the presentation format (temporal,
spatial, or spatiotemporal) and presentation rate for visual and auditory
material. Consistent with a modality-constrained view of learning, vision and
audition were best at encoding spatial and temporal regularities, respectively.
Finally, using a novel cross-over design, Chapter 4 presents three experiments
that pitted abstract, amodal processing against stimulus-specific learning and
found that statistical learning is mediated to a greater extent by stimulus-
specific, not abstract, representations. Taken together, the results from these
experiments suggest that statistical learning inherently involves learning
mechanisms that are heavily influenced by the perceptual and sensory
characteristics of the stimuli. I argue that a full understanding of statistical
learning – and likely other aspects of language and cognition – will come only
by specifying the role played by the senses. I conclude with a proposal for a
perceptual, modality-constrained view of implicit statistical learning framed
within the context of cognition as a whole.
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1CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Over a century ago, William James remarked that  “…our capacities for
forming new habits, for remembering sequences, and for abstracting general
properties from things and associating their usual consequences with
them…[are] exactly the faculties needed for steering us in this world of mixed
variety and uniformity”  (James, 1985/1892; p. xxvii). As James noted, the
world is a complex mixture of variability and structure. Learning to perceive
relevant environmental regularities amidst a background of change is an
important function for any successfully adapting organism. For humans,
detecting structure is mediated by multiple sense modalities. For instance, in
the auditory domain, speech elements (e.g., words and phonemes) occur not
randomly but according to certain regularities that can be described in terms
of statistical or probabilistic relationships (Altmann, 2002; Christiansen, Allen,
& Seidenberg, 1998; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). That is, language, once
learned, does not sound like incomprehensible gibberish; there is a lawful
order to the way that speech sounds and words occur in speech. Music is
another example of a structured auditory stimulus domain: music elements
occur with particular temporal and rhythmic regularities (Drake & Bertrand,
2001) that are detectable by adults and infants (Hannon & Johnson, in press).
Structure is also inherent in our visual environment, in the patterns of letters
and words that occur in print, as well as in the way in which objects and
features are arrayed in a visual scene (Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Olshausen & Field,
2000). Consider that our visual experience does not look like the chaotic
“white noise” of a television screen but contains recognizable exemplars in a
2non-random configuration. Finally, the tactile sense also subserves the
detection of environmental regularities: tactile communication devices used
by the visually impaired, such as Braille, exploit the fact that the sense of
touch can usefully pick up meaningful patterns of spatiotemporal stimulus
energies (Heller & Schiff, 1991).
Several decades of research have revealed that the ability to detect and
use such environmental regularities is not only fundamental to human
cognition and survival, but occurs relatively automatically and without
conscious awareness (Barlow, 2001; Berry, 1997; Berry & Dienes, 1993;
Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Reber, 1993; Seger, 1994; Stadler &
Frensch, 1998). This learning ability, here referred to as implicit statistical
learning, has been investigated through the use of the artificial grammar
learning (AGL) paradigm (Reber, 1967). In a standard AGL experiment, an
artificial grammar is used to generate stimuli that conform to certain rules
governing the order that elements can occur within a sequence. After being
exposed to a subset of structured sequences under incidental and
unsupervised learning conditions, it is the participants’ task to classify novel
stimuli in terms of whether they conform to the rules of the grammar.
Participants typically achieve a moderate degree of success, though they are
unable to verbally express the nature of the rules, leading to the assumption
that learning is “implicit”. Furthermore, because the task presumably requires
learners to extract the probabilistic structure of the stimuli, such as detecting
element co-occurrences or covariations between events, learning can be
regarded as one of computing and encoding statistically-based patterns.
The AGL paradigm has provided a rich database of knowledge
regarding the characteristics of implicit statistical learning. However, one
3major limitation to these studies is that the majority have used a single,
narrow stimulus domain (strings of letters), making it difficult to generalize
results across cognition. Researchers have mostly been content to study
implicit statistical learning without regard to the effect that different stimuli
may have on learning, likely due in part to two reasons. First, the field of
cognition has long been enamored with theories of amodal processing, where
perception is considered to be separate and independent of “higher” cognitive
processes such as memory or concept formation (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999).
Under this view, the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus elements are
relatively inconsequential to the operation of the supposed amodal implicit
learning mechanisms. The second reason is that, from the outset of AGL
research, it was discovered that participants could apparently transfer their
knowledge of the input structure from one letter set to another; that is, after
being exposed to grammatical strings using one letter vocabulary, learners
could then apply their knowledge of the underlying patterns to new strings
formed with a different letter set (Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Gomez, 1997;
Knowlton & Squire, 1996; Manza & Reber, 1997; Reber, 1969; Shanks,
Johnstone, & Staggs, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993). These transfer data
suggest to some that the acquired knowledge in AGL is abstract, consisting of
a high-level representation that generalizes the underlying complex input
structure while necessarily excluding stimulus-specific information (Reber,
1993).
Because of these two reasons, most researchers have resisted exploring
any effect that sense modality or stimulus characteristics might have on
implicit statistical learning, presumably because they do not expect any effect
to exist. In the handful of studies that have recently examined statistical
4learning in different sensory and stimulus domains (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002,
2001; Pothos & Bailey, 2000; Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999), the
data have not revealed modality differences. However, such a conclusion may
be premature given that these studies have not used comparable procedures
and materials when comparing learning in different domains. The one notable
exception is Saffran (2002), who examined AGL of visual and auditory
material and did in fact report modality effects. What is needed beyond this
single study is a more rigorous examination of learning across modalities and
stimulus domains. A theory of implicit learning, or indeed of any aspect of
cognition, will be incomplete if it does not take into account the role that sense
modality plays in processing (Tulving & Madigan, 1970).
Thus, the goal of this thesis is to investigate the role that sense modality
and stimulus characteristics have on implicit statistical learning. To preview,
the evidence from the following experiments suggests, in contrast to most
prevailing views, that the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus elements
do effect learning in important ways. Chapter 2 is a recently published paper
in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition that
explores statistical learning of tactile, visual, and auditory sequences (Conway
& Christiansen, 2005), presenting the first empirical evidence of implicit
statistical learning in the tactile domain. We find that although all three sense
modalities have the capability for affording AGL, there exist prominent
modality-specific learning differences. These learning differences took the
form of what we refer to as quantitative and qualitative effects. The learning of
sequential structure proceeded quantitatively better for auditory input
compared to the other modalities. Additionally, each sense modality was
5more or less qualitatively attuned to picking up regularities that occurred
toward the beginning or ending parts of sequences.
One possibility is that this auditory learning advantage is due to more
global modality constraints that affect perception, learning, and memory
across the senses. I argue that audition is excellent at tasks requiring temporal
processing adroitness, whereas vision excels at handling spatial
configurations. Chapter 3, a paper to be submitted to the journal Memory and
Cognition, directly explores this hypothesis by manipulating the presentation
format and presentation rate in visual AGL. Visual stimuli were distributed
temporally, spatially, or spatiotemporally. As predicted by our modality-
constrained view, learning in the visual-spatial condition exceeded the other
visual conditions, comparable to an auditory (temporal) condition.
Furthermore, we found that learning of visual-temporal structure declined the
most for the faster presentation rate, consistent with other research showing a
similar effect in short-term memory of temporal rhythms (Collier & Logan,
2002). Finally, the qualitative biases observed earlier in Chapter 2 were
replicated, supporting the notion that each learning subsystem has different
properties that govern its encoding efficacy.
Even though these two papers highlight the existence of learning-
related modality constraints, it may still be possible that the acquired
knowledge in an AGL task consists mainly of amodal or abstract
representations. To investigate this possibility, Chapter 4 presents a paper to
be submitted to Psychological Science that pits abstract versus stimulus-specific
knowledge. Using a novel modification of the standard AGL design, we
presented two different sets of statistically-governed stimuli to participants,
either in two different sense modalities or within the same modality. At test,
6they were given new exemplars from each of the two grammars, but with all
test items instantiated with one of the vocabularies only. The data showed that
participants learned both sets of structured stimuli independent of one
another – that is, specific to the sense modality in which it was originally
presented – as long as the two sets of stimuli existed in different sense
modalities (audition versus vision) or along different perceptual dimensions
(nonsense syllables versus tone sequences; color sequences versus shape
sequences). Thus, rather than the knowledge being in an amodal or abstract
form, these experiments show that AGL is highly stimulus-specific.
Together, these three papers point toward a new account of implicit
statistical learning, one that stresses sensory and perceptual constraints. In the
final chapter, Chapter 5, I propose that implicit learning arises from and is
continuous with perceptual processing, and as such, is heavily affected by the
sensory and perceptual features of the input domain in question. I offer an
outline for a perceptual theory of implicit statistical learning, guided by an
embodiment perspective (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Kan et al., 2003;
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2001), and drawing upon
data and theory from diverse research domains such as implicit memory,
perceptual learning, working memory, and serial recall. In closing, I suggest a
framework for understanding cognition as a whole in terms of modality-
constrained systems that perform a multitude of inter-related perceptual,
learning, and memorial functions.
In order to provide a foundation for the learning abilities displayed in
the next chapters, I next review recent evidence investigating statistical
learning in non-human primates.
7Statistical Learning in Non-Human Primates
It appears that many animal species are sensitive to statistical
information in the environment (Kelly & Martin, 1994).  For instance, rats are
highly sensitive to rate information governing the placement of food in a T-
shaped maze. Over numerous trials, the rat distributes its left-right choices
based on the probabilistic pattern of food placement (e.g., 70% to the left
versus 30%to the right). Rats also are sensitive to the contingencies occurring
between variables, demonstrated in classic conditioning experiments
(Rescorla, 1988). Thus, based on the evidence from rats, it appears that non-
human animals are adept at detecting statistical relationships in the
environment.
However, only recently have investigators examined statistical learning
in non-humans using a task comparable to that used with human adults and
infants (Hauser, Newport, & Aslin, 2001; for a review of non-human
sequential learning abilities more generally, see Conway & Christiansen,
2001). In the Hauser et al. study, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) first
were exposed to a 20-min sequential speech stream, consisting of four
different trisyllabic nonsense words (e.g., tupiro, golabu, bidaku, padoti)
concatenated together in random order.  The boundaries between words were
not marked by any acoustic or prosodic cues.  Afterwards, the tamarins were
exposed to different test sound sequences and were assessed on whether they
oriented toward the sound when it was played.  Some of the test sequences
were words that were contained within the speech stream, some were non-
words which contained syllables in an order that had not occurred in the
speech stream, and others were part-words, which contained syllable
sequences spanning a word boundary.  The tamarins were significantly more
8likely to orient toward non-words than to words, suggesting that they had
discriminated test sequences on the basis of syllable order.  The tamarins also
were significantly more likely to orient toward part-words than to words,
indicating that they were sensitive to the frequency of the syllable
combinations.  These results, which mirrored those of human infants (Saffran
et al., 1996), indicate that cotton-top tamarins--and presumably other primate
species--are able to encode some of the statistical regularities present in
language-like, auditory sequences.  However, it is important to note that while
the tamarins were exposed to a 20-min speech stream, the human infants
demonstrated statistical learning after only a 2-min exposure.
Two other studies have further illuminated primate statistical learning
abilities. Newport, Hauser, Spaepen, and Aslin (2004) showed that tamarin
monkeys can learn statistical regularities between non-adjacent elements. This
is an intriguing demonstration because human language consists of
regularities that occur not just among adjacent speech elements but also
between elements that are separated by intervening material. A second study
showed that tamarin monkeys can generalize patterns that they have learned
to a new vocabulary (Hauser, Weiss, & Marcus, 2002). It has been argued that
extracting these sorts of patterns is necessary for language acquisition
(Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999).
In summary, these studies appear to support the notion that statistical
learning is not limited to human cognition. Non-human primates and likely
other non-human animals appear to have many of the same statistical learning
capabilities as humans. However, it is likely that species-specific differences
exist, as well. For example, Newport et al. (2004) found differences in the types
of non-adjacent dependencies that were learned by human adults and tamarin
9monkeys. Thus, future research will be necessary to explore just how species-
general this capability is.
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CHAPTER TWO
Modality-Constrained Statistical Learning of Tactile, Visual, and
Auditory Sequences∗
The world is temporally bounded: Events do not occur all at once but
rather are distributed in time. Therefore, it is crucial for organisms to be able
to encode and represent temporal order information. One potential method
for encoding temporal order is to learn the statistical relationships of elements
within sequential input. This process appears to be important in a diverse set
of learning situations, including speech segmentation (Saffran, Newport, &
Aslin, 1996), learning orthographic regularities of written words (Pacton,
Perruchet, Fayol, & Cleeremans, 2001), visual processing (Fiser & Aslin, 2002),
visuomotor learning (e.g., serial reaction time tasks; Cleeremans, 1993) and
nonlinguistic auditory processing (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999).
Not only human adults but also infants (Gomez & Gerken, 1999; Kirkham,
Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) and nonhuman
primates (Hauser, Newport, & Aslin, 2001) are capable of statistical learning.
Noting such widespread examples of statistical learning, many
researchers—either implicitly or explicitly—view statistical learning as a
single, domain-general phenomenon (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2002). Although it
may be true that statistical learning across different domains is based on
similar computational principles, it is also likely that modality constraints
exist that may differentially affect such processing. For instance, traditionally,
                                                 
∗ Conway, C.M., & Christiansen, M.H. (2005).  Modality-constrained statistical learning of
tactile, visual, and auditory sequences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, &
Cognition, 31, 24-39. Copyright © 2005 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted
with permission.
16
vision and audition have been viewed as spatial and temporal senses,
respectively (Kubovy, 1988). Empirical evidence from perceptual and
temporal processing experiments supports such a distinction between vision
and audition (e.g., Glenberg & Swanson, 1986; Mahar, Mackenzie, & McNicol,
1994). However, it is currently unknown whether and how these modality
constraints affect the learning of statistical relationships between elements
contained within sequential input.
This article explores potential modality constraints affecting statistical
learning. Experiment 1 investigates statistical learning in three sensory
modalities: touch, vision, and audition. Experiment 1A provides the first
direct evidence that touch can mediate statistical learning. Experiments 1B and
1C compare learning in two additional sensory modalities, vision and
audition. Although commonalities exist, we find initial evidence for a striking
difference in auditory statistical learning compared with tactile and visual
learning. We follow up with Experiment 2, designed to control perceptual and
training effects as well as to tease apart potential learning sensitivities
uncovered in the first experiment. The results of Experiment 2 provide further
evidence that modality constraints affect statistical learning. We discuss these
results in relation to basic issues of cognitive and neural
organization—namely, to what extent statistical learning might consist of a
single or multiple neural mechanisms.
Statistical Learning of Sequential Input
Statistical learning appears to be a crucial learning ability. For instance,
making sense of visual scenes may require the extraction of statistical
components (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2001). Another domain in which statistical
17
learning likely plays an important role is the encoding of sequential input
(Conway & Christiansen, 2001). Artificial grammar learning (AGL; Reber,
1967) is a paradigm widely used for studying such statistical learning1. AGL
experiments typically use finite-state grammars to generate the stimuli. In
such grammars, a transition from one state to the next produces an element of
the sequence. For example, by passing through the nodes S1, S2, S2, S4, S3, S5
of Figure 2.1, one generates the “legal” sequence 4–1–3–5–2.
Figure 2.1. Artificial grammar from Gomez and Gerken (1999), also used
in the current Experiment 1. We generated legal sequences by following the
paths starting at S1 and continuing until we reached an exit path. Each path
generates a number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) that corresponds to a particular stimulus
element. S = state, so that S1 and S2 refer to State 1 and State 2, and so on.
In the AGL paradigm, participants observe a subset of legal training
sequences (i.e., sequences that are generated from the artificial grammar), after
which the participants typically display learning of sequential structure as
                                                 
1 The serial reaction time (SRT) task is another common method for exploring the learning of
sequential regularities. The SRT paradigm differs from AGL in that the behavioral measure
for the former is reaction time, whereas that for the latter is classification accuracy.
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evidenced by their ability to classify novel sequences as being legal or illegal.
Additionally, they often have difficulties verbalizing the distinction between
legal and illegal stimuli, a finding that originally prompted Reber (1967) to
describe the learning as implicit.
The nature of the cognitive processes underlying AGL has been the
subject of much debate, leading to the proposal of several different theories.
The abstractive view sees AGL as a process that encodes and extracts the
abstract rules of the grammar (e.g., Reber, 1993). Two alternative accounts
stand in contrast to the abstractive view, proposing that instead of abstract
knowledge, participants learn particular features of the training items. The
exemplar-based view posits that the stimuli themselves are encoded and
stored in memory (e.g., Vokey & Brooks, 1992): When participants make
classification judgments at test, they compare the test sequences with their
memory of the stored exemplars and make their decision on the basis of
similarity. The fragment-based view posits that participants learn small
fragments or chunks of information, consisting of pairs (bigrams) and triples
(trigrams) of elements (e.g., Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Participants use these
chunks of information to help them classify novel input.
Although there has been disagreement as to which theory is correct,
there is considerable evidence suggesting that the learning of fragment
information is a crucial aspect of AGL2 (e.g., Johnstone & Shanks, 1999;
Knowlton & Squire, 1994, 1996; Meulemans & Van der Linden, 1997; Perruchet
& Pacteau, 1990; Pothos & Bailey, 2000; Redington & Chater, 1996). These
experiments have shown that participants become sensitive to the fragment
                                                 
2 It also appears to be the case that learners rely on other cues, such as overall similarity of test
items to training exemplars, in addition to fragment information (e.g., see Pothos & Bailey,
2000).
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information contained within the training input, as quantified by specific
fragment measures, which allows participants to classify novel sequences in
terms of whether they conform to the same statistical regularities as the
training items. Such statistical sensitivity appears to be vital for AGL tasks.
The standard AGL paradigm has been used extensively to assess visual
as well as auditory (e.g., Saffran, 2000) learning. However, two issues remain
relatively unexplored: Can statistical learning occur in other modalities, such
as touch? And what differences in statistical learning, if any, exist among
different sensory modalities? Whereas previous research generally has
focused on the similarities among statistical learning in different domains
(Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2002), there are reasons to suppose that
modality constraints may affect learning across the various senses. Next, we
summarize evidence for such modality constraints.
Modality Constraints
Ample research testifies to the existence of modality constraints that
affect the manner in which people perceive, learn, and represent information
(for relevant reviews, see Freides, 1974; Penney, 1989). In this section we
summarize research in the realms of serial recall, temporal acuity, and the
learning of temporal and statistical patterns.
One of the most well-known modality effects—often referred to as the
modality effect—is found in serial recall. Numerous studies attest to
differences in the serial position learning curves for aurally versus visually
presented verbal input (e.g., lists of spoken or written words). Specifically,
there appears to be a stronger recency effect (i.e., better recall of final elements
in a list) for auditory as compared with visual material (Crowder, 1986; Engle
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& Mobley, 1976). A number of theories have attempted to explain this
modality effect, such as the traditional account supposing that a precategorical
acoustic storage exists for auditory material (Crowder & Morton, 1969) or that
the auditory modality benefits from better temporal coding (e.g., Glenberg &
Fernandez, 1988). Beaman (2002) showed that under certain conditions, a
stronger primacy effect (i.e., better recall of beginning elements in a list) occurs
for visual as compared with auditory material. Traditional theories do not
adequately explain why this might occur. Additionally, studies with
nonhuman primates have shown that monkeys have opposite serial position
curves for auditory and visual material (Wright, 2002), as a function of the
amount of time occurring between the last element in the list and the recall
test. That is, when the recall test occurs relatively soon after the list
presentation, there is an auditory primacy effect and a visual recency effect;
when the recall test occurs relatively late after the presentation, there is a
visual primacy and an auditory recency effect. These new data suggest that
different mechanisms may underlie auditory and visual serial recall, leading
to qualitatively different serial position curves.
Modality differences are also apparent in low-level temporal processing
tasks (e.g., Gescheider, 1966, 1967; Lechelt, 1975; Oatley, Robertson, & Scanlan,
1969; Sherrick & Cholewiak, 1986). For example, Sherrick and Cholewiak
(1986) reviewed data relating to temporal acuity in touch, vision, and audition.
In measures of simultaneity—the ability to correctly perceive two closely
occurring events—the senses have differing temporal sensitivity, with vision
being the least and audition the most sensitive. Similarly, Lechelt (1975)
assessed each modality in terms of numerosity, or the ability to count rapidly
presented stimuli. Stimuli consisting of flashes of light, aural clicks, or finger
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taps were delivered for short durations (2 ms or less), with sequences of
varying length (between two and nine pulses) and varying rates (between
three and eight signals per second). In terms of assessing the number of
signals in the sequences, participants performed best when the signals were
presented aurally and worst when they were presented visually.
Likewise, studies of temporal pattern and rhythm discrimination also
reveal modality differences (e.g., Collier & Logan, 2000; Garner &
Gottwald,1968; Glenberg & Jona, 1991; Handel & Buffardi, 1969; Manning,
Pasquali, & Smith, 1975; Rubinstein & Gruenberg, 1971). When presented with
rhythmic patterns of flashing lights or auditory stimuli, participants were
much better at discriminating auditory as opposed to visual patterns
(Rubinstein & Gruenberg, 1971). Learners were also better at identifying
repeating sequences of binary elements (e.g., 1122121211221212) when the
elements were auditory stimuli rather than visual or tactual ones (Handel &
Buffardi, 1969).
There have also been hints that similar modality constraints affect AGL.
Several studies have noted that performance in AGL tasks differs depending
on the modality and the manner of presentation (i.e., whether material is
presented simultaneously or sequentially). For instance, Gomez (1997)
remarked that visual AGL proceeds better when the stimuli are presented
simultaneously rather than sequentially, perhaps because a simultaneous
format permits better chunking of the stimulus elements. Saffran (2002) used
an AGL task to test participants’ ability to learn predictive dependencies. She
found that participants learned these predictive relationships best with an
auditory–sequential or visual–simultaneous presentation and did poorly in a
visual–sequential condition.
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The evidence reviewed suggests that modality differences are present
across the cognitive spectrum. These modality constraints take two main
forms. First, it appears that vision and audition differ in respect to their
sensitivities to the initial or final parts of sequential input. Vision may be more
sensitive to initial items in a list (Beaman, 2002), whereas audition appears
more sensitive to final list items (Crowder, 1986). Second, the auditory
modality appears to have an advantage in the processing of sequential input,
including low-level temporal processing tasks (Sherrick & Cholewiak, 1986)
and pattern or rhythm discrimination (e.g., Manning et al., 1975). In a
comprehensive review of the effect of modality on cognitive processing,
Friedes (1974) concluded that for complex tasks, audition is best suited for
temporal processing, whereas vision excels at spatial tasks (for similar views,
see also Kubovy, 1988; Mahar et al., 1994; Penney, 1989; Saffran, 2002). That is,
audition is best at processing sequential, temporally distributed input,
whereas vision excels at spatially distributed input. The touch modality
appears to be adept at processing both sequential and spatial input, but not at
the same level of proficiency as either audition or vision (Mahar et al., 1994).
In this article we explore in what manner these modality constraints
might affect statistical learning. In the experiments, our strategy is to
incorporate comparable input in three sensory conditions: touch, vision, and
audition. Previous researchers have claimed that statistical learning in
audition and vision is the same, yet rarely has much effort been made to
control experimental procedures and materials across the senses. Thus, the
present experiments provide a better comparison of learning across these
three modalities. We begin by investigating statistical learning in the tactile
domain, a realm that has been previously ignored in AGL experiments.
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Experiment 1A: Tactile Statistical Learning
The touch sense has been studied extensively in terms of its perceptual
and psychophysical attributes (see Craig & Rollman, 1999), yet it has not been
fully explored in relation to statistical learning. In Experiment 1A, we
presented to participants tactile sequences conforming to an artificial grammar
and then tested their ability to classify novel sequences. As reviewed above,
studies of sequential pattern perception suggest that the touch sense ought to
be capable of extracting sequential regularities in an AGL setting (e.g., Handel
& Buffardi, 1969; Manning et al., 1975). This experiment attempted to verify
this hypothesis.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduates (10 in each condition) from introductory
psychology classes at Southern Illinois University participated in the
experiment. Subjects earned course credit for their participation. The data
from an additional 5 participants were excluded for the following reasons:
prior participation in AGL tasks in our laboratory (n = 4), and failure to
adequately follow the instructions (n = 1).
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted with the PsyScope presentation
software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) run on an Apple G3
PowerPC computer. Participants made their responses using an input/output
button box (New Micros, Inc., Dallas, TX). Five small motors (18 mm × 5 mm),
normally used in hand-held paging devices, generated the vibrotactile pulses
(rated at 150 Hz). The vibration pulses were suprathreshold stimuli and easily
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perceived by all participants. The motors were controlled by output signals
originating from the New Micros button box. These control signals were in
turn determined by the PsyScope program, which allowed precise control
over the timing and duration of each vibration stimulus. Figure 2.2 shows the
general experimental setup.
Figure 2.2. Vibration devices attached to a participant’s hand with the
button box to the side (Experiment 1A)
Materials
The stimuli used for Experiment 1 were taken from Gomez and
Gerken’s (1999) Experiment 2. This grammar (see Figure 2.1) can generate up
to 23 sequences between three and six elements in length. The grammar
generates sequences of numbers. Each number from the grammar was
mapped onto a particular finger (1 was the thumb, and 5 was the pinky
finger). Each sequence generated from the grammar thus represents a series of
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vibration pulses delivered to the fingers, one finger at a time. Each finger
pulse duration was 250 ms, and the pulses within a sequence were separated
by 250 ms. As an illustration, the sequence 1–2–5–5 corresponds to a 250-ms
pulse delivered to the thumb, a 250-ms pause, a 250-ms pulse delivered to the
second finger, a 250-ms pause, a 250-ms pulse delivered to the fifth finger, a
250-ms pause, and then a final 250-ms pulse delivered to the fifth finger.
Figure 2.3 graphically represents this sequence.
Figure 2.3. Graphical representation of the tactile sequence 1–2–5–5 in
Experiment 1A. Each hand represents a single slice in time, whereas each
black circle represents the occurrence of a vibrotactile pulse to a particular
finger.
A total of 12 legal sequences were used for training.3 Each of the legal
sequences was used twice to formulate a set of 12 training pairs. Six pairs
consisted of the same training sequence presented twice (matched pairs),
                                                 
3 Note that what we refer to as the training phase contained neither performance feedback nor
reinforcement of any kind. Exposure phase might be a more accurate description of this part
of the experiment.
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whereas the remaining 6 pairs consisted of 2 sequences that differed slightly
from one another (mismatched pairs). These matched and mismatched
training pairs were used in conjunction with a same–different judgment task,
described in detail below. The 12 training pairs are listed in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Training Pairs for Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C
Matched pairs Mismatched pairs
1-2-1-1-1-3 / 1-2-1-1-1-3 1-2-3-5-2-5 / 1-2-3-5-2-3
4-1-1-3-5-2 / 4-1-1-3-5-2 1-2-3-5-2-3 / 1-2-3-5-2-5
4-1-3-5-2 / 4-1-3-5-2 4-3-5-2-3 / 4-3-5-2-5
1-2-5-5-5 / 1-2-5-5-5 4-3-5-2-5 / 4-3-5-2-3
4-1-3 / 4-1-3 1-2-5-5 / 1-2-1-3
1-2-3 / 1-2-3 1-2-1-3 / 1-2-5-5
Note.  The numbers refer to a particular finger vibration (Experiment 1A),
visual stimulus (Experiment 1B), or auditory tone (Experiment 1C.).
The test set consisted of 10 novel legal and 10 illegal sequences. Legal
sequences were produced from the finite-state grammar in the normal fashion.
Illegal sequences did not conform to the regularities of the grammar. The
illegal sequences each began with a legal element (i.e., 1 or 4), followed by one
or more illegal transitions and ending with a legal element (i.e., 2, 3, or 5). For
example, the illegal sequence 4–2–1–5–3 begins and ends with legal elements
(4 and 3, respectively) but contains several illegal interior transitions (4–2, 1–5,
and 5–3, combinations of elements that the grammar does not allow).
Therefore, the legal and illegal sequences can be described as differing from
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one another in terms of the statistical relationships between adjacent elements.
That is, a statistical learning mechanism able to encode the possible element
combinations occurring in the training set could discern which novel test
sequences are illegal. For instance, by realizing that the elements 4 and 2 never
occur together in the training set, a learner could potentially discern that the
novel test sequence 4–2–1–5–3 is illegal.4 Finally, the legal and illegal test
sequences were closely matched in terms of element frequencies and sequence
lengths (Gomez & Gerken, 1999). All test sequences are listed in Table 2.2.
Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to either a control group or an
experimental group. The experimental group participated in both a training
and a test phase, whereas the control group only participated in the test phase.
Before beginning the experiment, all participants were assessed by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) to determine their
preferred hand. The experimenter then placed a vibration device onto each of
the five fingers of the participant’s preferred hand. At the beginning of the
training phase, the experimental group participants were instructed that they
were participating in a sensory experiment in which they would feel pairs of
vibration sequences. For each pair of sequences, they had to decide whether
the two sequences were the same and indicate their decision by pressing a
button marked YES or NO. This match–mismatch paradigm used the 12
training pairs described earlier, listed in Table 2.1. It was our intention that
this paradigm would encourage participants to pay attention to the stimuli
                                                 
4 Note that we remain neutral as to whether such performance might occur in the presence or
absence of awareness.
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while not directly tipping them off to the nature of the statistically governed
sequences.
Table 2.2
Fragment Measures for Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C Test Sequences
Legal Test Sequences
Item Chunk Novel NFP Sim I-Anchor F-Anchor
4-1-3-5-2-3 4.11 0 0 2 2.5 2.5
1-2-1-3-5-2 4.11 0 0 2 4.5 2.0
4-3-5-2-5-5 3.67 0 2 4 2.0 1.5
4-1-3-5-2-5  4.00 0  0  2  2.5  2.0
4-1-1-1-3  2.57  0  3  3  2.0  2.0
1-2-1-1-3   3.14  0  2  2  4.5  2.0
1-2-3-5-2 5.0  0  0 1 5.0  2.0
4-1-1-3  2.80  0  0 2  2.0 2.0
4-3-5-2 4.40 0 0 1 2.0 2.0
1-2-5 4.33 0 0 1 4.5 1.0
Averages: 3.81  0.0 0.70 2.00 3.15 1.9
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Table 2.2 (Continued)
Illegal Test Sequences
1-4-5-1-3-3 0.56 8 9 3 0 0
4-5-1-2-1-3 1.89 4 8 3 0 2.0
4-2-1-3-1-5 0.89 6 6 3 0 0
1-5-3-3-2-2 0.00 9 9 3 0 0
1-5-3-4-2 0.00 7 7 3 0 0
4-2-1-5-3 0.29 6 6 3 0 0
1-5-3-1-2 1.00 6 7 3 0 0
4-5-1-3 1.00 4 4 2 0 1.5
4-5-2-2 1.20 4 5 3 0 0
1-4-2 0.00 3 3 2 0 0
Averages:  0.68 5.70 6.40 2.80 0 0.35
_____________________________________________________________________
Note. NFP = Novel fragment position; Sim = similarity; I-anchor = initial
anchor strength; F-anchor = final anc. str.
Each pair was presented six times in random order for a total of 72
exposures. As mentioned earlier, all vibration pulses had a duration of 250 ms
and were separated by 250 ms within a sequence. A 2-s pause occurred
between the two sequences of each pair and after the last sequence of the pair.
A prompt was displayed on the computer monitor asking for the participant’s
response, and it stayed on the screen until a button press was made. After
another 2-s pause, the next training pair was presented. The entire training
phase lasted roughly 10 min for each participant.
A recording of white noise was played during training to mask the
sounds of the vibrators. In addition, the participants’ hands were occluded so
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that they could not visually observe their fingers. These precautions were
taken to ensure that tactile information alone, without help from auditory or
visual senses, contributed to task performance.
Before the beginning of the test phase, the experimental group
participants were told that the vibration sequences they had just felt had been
generated by a computer program that determined the order of the pulses by
using a complex set of rules. They were told that they would now be
presented with new vibration sequences. Some of these would be generated
by the same program, whereas others would not be. It was the participant’s
task to classify each new sequence accordingly (i.e., whether or not the
sequence was generated by the same rules) by pressing a button marked either
YES or NO. The control participants, who did not participate in the training
phase, received an identical test task.
The 20 test sequences were presented one at a time, in random order, to
each participant. The timing of the test sequences was the same as that used
during the training phase (250-ms pulse duration, 250-ms interstimulus
interval, and 2-s pauses before and after each sequence). The white noise
recording and occluding procedures also were continued in the test phase.
At the completion of the experiment, participants were asked how they
decided whether test sequences were legal or illegal. Some researchers have
used such verbal reports as a preliminary indication as to whether learning
proceeded implicitly or explicitly (Seger, 1994).
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Results and Discussion
We assessed the training performance for the experimental participants
by calculating the mean percentage of correctly classified pairs. Participants,
on average, made correct match–mismatch decisions for 74% of the training
trials.
However, for our purposes, the test results are of greater interest
because here the participants must generalize from training experience to
previously unobserved test sequences. The control group correctly classified
45% of the test sequences, whereas the experimental group correctly classified
62% of the test sequences. Following Redington and Chater’s (1996)
suggestions, we conducted two analyses on the test data. The first was a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA; experimental vs. control group) to
determine whether any differences existed between the two groups. The
second compared performances for each group with hypothetical chance
performance (50%) using single group t tests.
The ANOVA revealed that the main effect of group was significant, F(1,
18) = 3.16, p < .01, indicating that the experimental group performed
significantly better than the control group. Single group t tests confirmed the
ANOVA’s finding. The control group’s performance was not significantly
different from chance, t(9) = 1.43, p = .186, whereas the experimental group’s
performance was significantly above chance, t(9) = 2.97, p < .05.
Finally, the participants’ verbal reports suggest that they had very little
explicit knowledge concerning sequence legality. Most of the experimental
group participants reported basing their responses merely on whether a
sequence felt familiar or similar. Several of the participants reported that they
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made their judgments on the basis of a simple rule (e.g., “If a sequence was
four elements long, I said ‘no’”). However, in each of these cases, following
the rule would actually lead to incorrect judgments. None of the participants
was able to report anything specific that could actually help him or her make a
decision (e.g., “Certain finger combinations were not allowed, such as the
fourth finger followed by the second”). On the basis of these verbal reports,
we do not see evidence that the experimental group participants were
explicitly aware of the distinction between legal and illegal sequences.5
The results show that the experimental group significantly
outperformed the control group. This suggests that the experimental
participants learned aspects of the statistical structure of the training
sequences—in the form of adjacent element co-occurrence statistics—that
allowed them to classify novel test sequences appropriately. Additionally, the
participants had difficulty verbalizing the nature of sequence legality. This is
the first empirical evidence of an apparently implicit, tactile statistical learning
capability.
Experiments 1B and 1C: Visual and Auditory Statistical Learning
Experiment 1A showed that statistical learning can occur in the tactile
domain. To compare tactile with visual and auditory learning, we conducted
two additional studies. Experiments 1B and 1C assessed statistical learning in
the visual and auditory domains, respectively, using the same general
procedure and statistically governed stimulus set as used in Experiment 1A.
For Experiment 1B, the sequences consisted of visual stimuli occurring at
                                                 
5 We note, however, that verbal reports are not necessarily the most sensitive measure of
explicit awareness, so it is still possible that explicit awareness contributed to task
performance.
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different spatial locations. For Experiment 1C, sequences of tones were used.
Like the vibrotactile sequences, the visual and auditory stimuli were
nonlinguistic, and thus participants could not rely on a verbal encoding
strategy.
Method
Participants
Experiment 1B. Twenty undergraduates (10 in each condition) were
recruited from introductory psychology classes at Cornell University. Subjects
received extra credit for their participation. The data from 3 additional
participants were excluded because the participants did not adequately follow
the instructions (n = 2) and because of equipment malfunction (n = 1).
Experiment 1C. An additional 20 undergraduates (10 in each condition)
were recruited from introductory psychology classes at Cornell University.
Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1A, except for the
exclusion of the vibration devices. The auditory stimuli were generated by the
SoundEdit 16 (Version 2) software for the Macintosh.
Materials
The training and test materials were identical to those of Experiment
1A (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The difference was that the sequence elements
were mapped onto visual or auditory stimuli instead of vibrotactile pulses.
For Experiment 1B, the stimuli consisted of black squares displayed on the
computer monitor in different locations (the element 1 represents the leftmost
location, and 5 the rightmost). Each black square (2.6 × 2.6 cm) was positioned
in a horizontal row across the middle of the screen at approximately eye level,
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with 2.5 cm separating each position. Participants were seated at a viewing
distance of approximately 45 cm to 60 cm from the monitor.
A visual stimulus thus consisted of a spatiotemporal sequence of black
squares appearing at various locations. As in Experiment 1A, each element
appeared for 250 ms, and each was separated by 250 ms. Figure 2.4 shows a
representation of the sequence 1–2–5–5.
Figure 2.4. Graphical representation of the visual sequence 1–2–5–5 in
Experiment 1B. Each of the four large rectangles represents the monitor
display at a single slice in time. Note that the dashed squares, representing the
five possible stimulus element locations, were not visible to the participants.
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For Experiment 1C, the stimuli consisted of pure tones of various
frequencies (1 = 261.6 Hz, 2 = 277.2 Hz, 3 = 349.2 Hz, 4 = 370 Hz, and 5 = 493.9
Hz) corresponding to musical notes C, C#, F, F#, and B, respectively.6 As in
Experiments 1A and 1B, each element (tone) lasted 250 ms, and each was
separated by 250 ms. Figure 2.5 graphically represents the sequence 1–2–5–5.
Procedure
The procedures were the same as that of Experiment 1A, the only
differences relating to the nature of the stimulus elements, as described above.
The timing of the stimuli, pauses, and prompts was identical to the timing in
Experiment 1A.
Figure 2.5. Graphical representation of the auditory sequence 1–2–5–5 in
Experiment 1C.
                                                 
6 This particular set of tones was used because it avoids familiar melodies (Dowling, 1991).
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Results
We performed the same statistical analyses as used in Experiment 1A.
During the training phase, the Experiment 1B (visual) experimental group
made correct match–mismatch decisions on 86% of the trials, whereas the
Experiment 1C (auditory) experimental group scored 96%. We compared the
training means across the three experiments, which revealed a main effect of
modality, F(2, 27) = 24.30, p < .0001. Thus, auditory training performance was
significantly better than visual performance (p < .005), which in turn was
significantly better than tactile performance (p < .001). Because the training
task essentially involves remembering and comparing sequences within pairs,
the results may elucidate possible differences among the three modalities in
representing and maintaining sequential information (Penney, 1989). It is also
possible that these results instead are due to factors such as differential
discriminability or perceptibility of sequence elements in different sensory
domains.
Results for the test phase in Experiment 1B revealed that the control
group correctly classified 47% of the test sequences, whereas the experimental
group correctly classified 63% of the test sequences. An ANOVA
(experimental vs. control group) indicated that the main effect of group was
significant, F(1, 18) = 3.15, p < .01. Single group t tests revealed that the control
group’s performance was not significantly different from chance, t(9) = 1.11, p
= .3, whereas the experimental group’s performance was significantly
different from chance, t(9) = 3.03, p < .05.
Results for the auditory (Experiment 1C) test phase revealed that the
control group correctly classified 44% of the test sequences, whereas the
experimental group correctly classified 75% of the test sequences. An ANOVA
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(experimental vs. control group) indicated that the main effect of group was
significant, F(1, 18) = 7.08, p < .001. Single group t tests revealed that the
control group’s performance was marginally worse than chance, t(9) = 2.25, p
= .051, indicating that our test stimuli were biased against a positive effect of
learning. The experimental group’s performance was significantly different
from chance, t(9) = 7.45, p < .001.
Participants’ verbal reports in Experiments 1B and 1C were similar to
those in Experiment 1A. Namely, the most common report given was that
participants were basing their classification decisions on how similar or
familiar the sequences were relative to the training items. None of the
participants was able to verbalize any of the rules governing the sequences.
Therefore, it appears that participants generally did not benefit from explicit
knowledge of the sequence structure.
These results indicate that both the visual and the auditory
experimental groups significantly outperformed the control groups, with
participants unable to verbalize how the legal and illegal sequences differed.
Hence, participants appear to have implicitly learned aspects of the statistical
structure of the visual and auditory input. These initial analyses suggest
commonalities among tactile, visual, and auditory statistical learning.
However, one striking difference is that the auditory test performance
was substantially better than tactile or visual performance (75% vs. 62% and
63%; see Figure 2.6). Submitting these three test performances to an ANOVA
reveals a main effect of modality, F(2, 27) = 3.43, p < 0.05, with the effect due to
the auditory performance being significantly better than both touch and vision
(ps < .05). Thus, it appears that in this task, auditory statistical learning was
more proficient than both tactile and visual learning. This is in accord with
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previous research emphasizing audition as being superior among the senses in
regard to temporal processing tasks in general (e.g., Friedes, 1974; Handel &
Buffardi, 1969; Sherrick & Cholewiak, 1986).
Figure 2.6. Experiment 1: Mean number of correct test responses out of
20 (plus standard error) for the experimental (indicated by solid bars) and
control (indicated by open bars) groups. Ten is the level expected for chance
performance.
Discussion
The previous analyses have offered a quantitative comparison among
tactile, visual, and auditory learning, revealing better learning in the auditory
condition. One possible objection to this conclusion is that the auditory
experiment differs from the first two experiments in that pitch, instead of
space, is the primary stimulus dimension being manipulated. A different
possibility would have been to set up five speakers at five different spatial
locations, each one producing the same pitch stimulus at different times in the
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sequence, much like the visual stimuli were displayed in Experiment 1B.
However, it has been proposed that for the auditory modality, pitch is, in a
sense, equivalent to space (Kubovy, 1988). Shamma (2001) argued that the
auditory nervous system transforms sound input, through the cochlea, into
spatiotemporal response patterns, and therefore the visual and auditory
systems process spatial and temporal input, respectively, in computationally
similar ways. Thus, the perception of pitch and the perception of
visual–spatial patterns may arise through similar computational algorithms in
the two sensory modalities. For this reason, we believe that the most
appropriate test for auditory statistical learning is to use stimulus elements
that differ along the dimension of pitch rather than that of space. This is
consistent with previous tests of auditory AGL to use stimulus elements that
vary in terms of pitch or syllable rather than space. Although this research has
found similar statistical learning performances in vision and audition (Fiser &
Aslin, 2002; Saffran, 2002), our data suggest a quantitative advantage for
auditory learning relative to tactile and visual learning.
We might also ask whether there were any qualitative learning
differences among the three modalities. For example, were there particular
test sequences within each modality that participants were better or worse at
correctly endorsing? Which types of statistical information did participants
within each modality rely on to perform the test task? To answer these
questions, we present several additional analyses.
We first investigated whether certain sequences were easier or more
difficult to classify for each modality. We conducted item analyses across the
three sense modalities, entering the test performance data averaged across
subjects for each sequence. This two-way ANOVA (Modality × Sequence)
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resulted in main effects of modality, F(2, 540) = 4.73, p < .01, and sequence,
F(19, 540) = 1.69, p < .05, but no interaction of modality and sequence, F(38,
540) = 1.20, p = .2.
To get a better idea about which sources of information are most
valuable for each modality, we analyzed each test sequence in terms of the
information content that participants may have used to guide test
performance. We used five fragment measures: associative chunk strength,
novelty, novel fragment position (NFP), initial anchor strength (I-anchor), and
final anchor strength (F-anchor). Associative chunk strength is calculated as
the average frequency of occurrence of each test item’s fragments (bigrams
and trigrams), relative to the training items (Knowlton & Squire, 1994).
Novelty is the number of fragments that did not appear in any training item
(Redington & Chater, 1996). NFP is measured as the number of fragments that
occur in novel absolute positions where they did not occur in any training
item (Johnstone & Shanks, 1999). We designed the I-anchor and F-anchor
measures to indicate the relative frequencies of initial and final fragments in
similar positions in the training items. Previous studies used a single anchor
strength measure (e.g., Knowlton & Squire, 1994) instead of calculating the
initial and final measures separately, as we do here. We consider I-anchor and
F-anchor separately to determine whether modality constraints lead
participants to be more or less sensitive to the beginnings or endings of
sequences.7 Finally, we used a measure of global similarity, which is the
number of elements by which a test item is different from the nearest training
item (Vokey & Brooks, 1992).
                                                 
7 Meulemans and Van der Linden (2003) also used separate I-anchor and F-anchor measures.
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We computed these six measures for each of the 20 test sequences, and
the results are listed in Table 2.2. Inspection of this table reveals that the legal
and illegal test sequences differ considerably in terms of their chunk, I-anchor,
F-anchor, novel, and NFP information. It is therefore likely that one or more of
these information sources guided participants in making their classification
judgments at test.
To see which information sources were used for each modality, we
used regression analyses. Our initial regression model contained the six
sources of information listed in Table 2.2 as predictors, in addition to two
other predictors: length of each sequence, as measured by the number of
elements per sequence, and legality, which was simply an index of whether
the sequence was legal or illegal. Because these eight predictors are highly
correlated with one another, we submitted them to a principal-components
analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of predictors to use in the regression
analyses. The results of the PCA revealed that the eight predictors could be
reduced to two components, explaining 87.7% of the variance. These two
components are listed in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3
Results of Principal Component Analysis
Component 1 Component 2
Chunk 0.950 0.179
Novel -0.953 -0.002
NFP -0.945 0.153
Sim -0.696 0.536
Length -0.154 0.949
I-Anchor 0.903 0.007
F-Anchor 0.846 0.302
Legality 0.947 0.184
Note. NFP = Novel fragment position; Sim = similarity; I-anchor = initial
anchor strength; F-anchor = final anc. str.
As can be seen, the first component is roughly a measure of chunk
strength, including I-anchor and F-anchor, and is also an inverse measure of
novelty and NFP. This is intuitive, because a sequence with a high chunk or
anchor strength contains fewer novel fragments. The second component is
nearly equivalent with length. With these results in mind, we decided to use
three predictors in our multiple regression model: I-anchor, F-anchor, and
length. Note that in essence, what we did was separate the first component
(which is roughly equivalent to chunk strength) into initial and final chunk
strength predictors. We did this with the expectation that the multiple
regression analysis might reveal possible modality constraints related to
beginning or ending sequence biases.
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The results of the regression analyses will inform us as to which of
these three measures best predict whether a participant in each sensory
condition will endorse a test sequence. We performed one linear regression for
each modality. The results reveal that length (p < .05) and I-anchor (p < .005)
were good predictors for tactile endorsements. F-anchor (p < .005) was a good
predictor for auditory endorsements. None of the three predictors was a
statistically significant predictor for visual endorsements.
In summary, the item analyses revealed no differences in terms of
performance on individual sequences across the modalities. However, the
multiple regression analyses revealed that there may be differences in terms of
which sources of information are most important for test performance in each
of the three modalities. We found that tactile learners were most sensitive to
the length of the sequence and the fragment information at the beginning of a
sequence, auditory learners were most sensitive to fragment information at
the end of a sequence, and visual learners were biased toward neither the
beginning nor the ending of the sequences. Thus, these preliminary analyses
suggest that not only does auditory statistical learning of tone sequences have
a quantitative advantage over tactile and visual learning, there also may be
qualitative differences among the three modalities. Specifically, tactile
learning appears to be sensitive to initial item chunk information, whereas
auditory learning is most sensitive to final item chunk information.
Experiment 2: Tactile, Visual, and Auditory Statistical Learning
The first three experiments assessed statistical learning of tactile, visual,
and auditory sequences. The results suggest the presence of modality
differences affecting learning. Specifically, there was a quantitative learning
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difference in that auditory learning was superior to the other two senses.
There was also evidence for qualitative learning differences in that the sense
modalities appeared to be differentially sensitive to the initial or final aspects
of the sequences. However, one unresolved question is whether the observed
learning differences are merely the result of low-level, perceptual effects of the
particular stimulus elements used in the three experiments. For example, it is
possible that auditory learning was more effective because the set of tones
used in Experiment 1C may have been more distinctive than the set of
vibration pulses or visual stimuli used in Experiments 1A and 1B. Similarly,
recall that auditory training performance was significantly better than visual
or tactile performances; perhaps the superior auditory test scores were due to
better performance in the training phase.
To better control for perceptual and training effects, we conducted
Experiment 2, which was similar to the first set of experiments except for
several crucial modifications. We used a pretraining phase to assess the
perceptual comparability of the stimulus elements across modalities. Also, we
used a modified training task in which participants observed a sequence
followed by a bigram fragment and then judged whether the bigram fragment
had occurred within the sequence. We adopted this new training task to
ensure similar training performance levels across the three modalities. In
addition, we used a randomized design to ensure that any differences across
conditions were not the result of differences in population samples. Finally,
we provided a more substantive test for qualitative learning differences by
incorporating test stimuli that could better assess whether participants were
differentially sensitive to statistical information in the beginnings or endings
of sequences. Our hypothesis, following the analyses of Experiment 1, was
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that participants would be more sensitive to the initial fragments when
exposed to tactile sequences, whereas they would be more sensitive to the
final fragments when exposed to auditory sequences.
Method
Participants
An additional 48 undergraduates (8 in each condition) were recruited
from introductory psychology classes at Cornell University.
Apparatus
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.
Materials
To generate the stimuli used for Experiment 2, we created a new finite-
state grammar (Figure 2.7). This grammar was created with two main
constraints in mind. First, we intended it to be more complex than that used in
Experiment 1. The new grammar can generate up to 75 sequences between
three and seven elements in length (as opposed to 23 sequences in Experiment
1), allowing for a more difficult learning task. Second, we created the new
finite-state grammar to allow us to test the hypothesis that learners are more
or less sensitive to beginning or ending aspects of sequences in each sense
modality. The grammar is symmetrical in terms of the number of possible
bigrams and trigrams allowed in initial and final positions.8 Thus, it is not
biased toward the beginning or ending aspects of sequences in terms of the
amount of chunk information available. This allows us to have better control
over what parts of the sequences may be useful for the learner.
                                                 
8 There are 6 unique initial bigrams, 6 unique final bigrams, 13 unique initial trigrams, and 13
unique final trigrams.
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Figure 2.7. Artificial grammar used in Experiment 2.
The five stimulus elements making up the sequences were identical to
those used in Experiment 1 except for the auditory tones. The tone set used for
the auditory stimuli was slightly different from before, consisting of 220 Hz,
246.9 Hz, 261.6 Hz, 277.2 Hz, and 329.6 Hz (i.e., the musical notes A, B, C, C#,
and E, respectively). As with the previous tone set, we used these tones
because they avoid familiar melodies (Dowling, 1991). Additionally, this new
tone set spans a smaller frequency range (220 Hz to 329.6 Hz, as opposed to
261.6 Hz to 493.8 Hz).
We also tested all materials for their discriminability across modalities.
Ten separate participants took part in a discrimination task in which they
received two stimuli (within the same modality) and judged whether they
were the same or different. Participants were presented with all of the possible
pairwise combinations for each modality. The data revealed that participants
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were able to correctly discriminate the stimuli at near-perfect levels across all
three modalities (tactile: 95%; visual: 98.3%; auditory: 98.8%), with no
statistical difference in performance among modalities (p = .87).
Pretraining phase. For the pretraining phase, each of the five stimulus
elements was paired with each other to give every possible combination (52 =
25 possible combinations). Because responses for pairs such as 3–2/2–3 and
1–4/4–1 were averaged together in the analysis (see the Results section), we
presented the 5 pairs that contain identical elements two times instead of once
(e.g., 1–1, 2–2). This gave a total of 30 stimulus pairs. Each stimulus element
had a duration of 250 ms, and elements were separated by 250 ms. The
pretraining materials are listed in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4
Pre-training Materials for Experiment 2                                                                   
1-1 (x2) 1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5
2-1 2-2 (x2) 2-3 2-4 2-5
3-1 3-2 3-3 (x2) 3-4 3-5
4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 (x2) 4-5
5-1 5-2 5-3 5-4 5-5 (x2)
Note. (x2) indicates that this element pair was presented twice.
Training phase. A total of 24 legal sequences were generated from the
new finite-state grammar and used for the training phase. Each of these
sequences was coupled with a particular bigram fragment. For half of the
sequences, the bigram appeared within the sequence (e.g., 3–4–5–1–2–3–2 and
1–2). For the other half of the sequences, the bigram itself did not occur within
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the sequence, but the elements composing the bigram did (e.g., 1–2–3–5–2–3–2
and 1–3). In all cases, the bigrams presented after the sequence were legal
according to the finite-state grammar. Each stimulus element had a duration
of 250 ms and was separated from the elements before and after by 250 ms. A
2-s pause separated the sequence from the bigram. The training materials are
listed in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5
Training Materials for Experiment 2                                                            
5-3-1-3-2-3-4 / 5-3 3-4-4-5-4-4-4 / 3-5
3-2-3-1-4-5-2 / 2-3 3-2-3-1-3-2-4 / 3-4
1-2-3-5-4-4-4 / 3-5 3-4-4-5-4-5-2 / 5-3
3-4-5-1-4-5-2 / 1-4 5-1-3-1-2-3-2 / 2-1
3-4-5-1-2-3-2 / 1-2 3-3-2-5-4-5-2 / 4-3
3-3-2-5-2-3-2 / 2-3 3-2-3-1-4-4-4 / 4-1
5-1-1-1-1-3-2 / 3-2 1-2-3-5-2-3-2 / 1-3
3-4-5-1-4-4-4 / 3-4 5-3-1-4-4-3-4 / 4-5
5-3-1-4-5-2 / 3-1 3-4-5-1-4-1 / 4-3
3-4-4-5-4-1 / 4-5 5-1-3-1-4-1 / 4-3
5-3-1-4-4-4 / 4-4 3-4-4-3-3-4 / 3-2
3-2-1-1-3-2 / 3-2 5-3-1-2-3-2 / 5-1
Note.  The numbers refer to a particular finger vibration, visual stimulus, or
auditory tone.
Test phase. The test set consisted of 16 novel legal and 16 novel illegal
sequences. Legal sequences were produced from the finite-state grammar in
the normal fashion. We produced illegal sequences by changing two elements
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of each legal test sequence. We created 8 of the illegal sequences, referred to as
illegal–initial sequences, by modifying the second and third elements of a
legal sequence (e.g., legal: 5–1–3–1–4–5–2; illegal: 5–5–2–1–4–5–2). We created
the other 8 illegal sequences, referred to as illegal–final sequences, by
modifying the third-to-last and second-to-last elements of a legal sequence
(e.g., legal: 3–2–3–1–2–3–2; illegal: 3–2–3–1–5–2–2). Each illegal sequence was
paired with the legal sequence from which it was generated, counterbalanced
so that all sequences appeared both first and last, giving a total of 32 test pairs.
Each stimulus element had a duration of 250 ms and was separated by 250 ms.
A 2-s pause separated one sequence from the next within a pair. Table 2.6 lists
the test materials.
We created the Experiment 2 test sequences so that information about
legal element repetitions would not be useful. For instance, Table 2.6 reveals
that out of the 32 test sequences, 18 are relevant for element repetitions, and
the other 14 sequences are neutral in regard to element repetition information.
If one uses the strategy of choosing the sequence within a pair containing legal
element repetitions (i.e., those repetitions seen in the training sequences), this
would lead to only 8 out of 18 correct endorsements. Thus, such a strategy is
actually worse than random guessing, meaning that the test sequences are
well controlled in terms of element repetition information.
Additionally, as we did in Experiment 1, we can analyze the test
sequences in terms of chunk, novelty, and similarity information in relation to
the training set. We divided the test set into four groups: legal–initial,
illegal–initial, legal–final, and illegal–final. We then analyzed each group in
terms of the fragment measures and made statistical comparisons among the
various groups.
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Table 2.6
Fragment Measures for Experiment 2 Test Sequences
Legal-Initial Sequences
Item Chunk Novel NFP Sim I-Anchor F-Anchor
5-1-3-1-4-5-2 6.27 0 0 2 2.50 5.00
1-2-3-3-5-4-1 3.27 2 8 3 2.00 2.00
3-3-2-3-3-4 5.56 1 3 2 2.00 2.00
1-2-5-3-2-3-4 4.91 3 5 3 1.00 2.00
3-4-5-1-3-2-4 6.09 0 1 2 6.00 1.00
1-2-5-4-4-3-4 4.18 1 5 3 1.00 2.00
1-2-5-4-4-4 5.56 1 5 3 1.00 5.00
1-2-5-3-2-4 3.22 3 7 4 1.00 1.00
Averages: 4.88 1.38 4.25 2.75 2.06 2.50
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Table 2.6 (Continued)
Illegal-Initial Sequences
Item Chunk Novel NFP Sim I-anchor F-anchor
5-5-2-1-4-5-2 4.00 4 6 3 0.00 5.00
1-1-1-3-5-4-1 2.73 1 9 5 0.00 2.00
3-5-5-3-3-4 2.44 4 6 2 0.00 2.00
1-4-4-3-2-3-4 6.73 1 3 3 0.00 2.00
3-1-2-1-3-2-4 4.09 2 6 2 0.00 1.00
1-1-1-4-4-3-4 4.91 1 3 2 0.00 2.00
1-5-1-4-4-4 6.44 2 4 2 0.00 5.00
1-4-2-3-2-4 4.67 3 8 3 0.00 1.00
Averages: 4.50 2.25 5.62 2.75 0.00 2.5
                                                                                                                                    
Legal-Final Sequences
1-2-3-3-3-4 4.33 2 3 3 2.00 2.00
3-2-3-1-2-3-2 7.82 0 0 2 3.50 6.00
3-3-2-3-3-3-4 4.82 2 6 3 2.00 2.00
3-4-4-3-3-3-4 4.82 1 3 3 6.00 2.00
3-2-1-3-1-4-1 5.00 1 7 4 2.50 2.50
3-4-4-3-5-4-1  4.18 1 6 3 6.00 2.00
3-2-3-1-4-1 7.00 0 0 2 3.50 2.50
1-2-3-5-3-2-4 4.27 2 3 2  2.00 1.00
Averages: 5.28 1.12 3.50 2.75 3.44 2.50
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Table 2.6 (Continued)
Illegal-Final Sequences
Item Chunk Novel NFP Sim I-anchor F-anchor
1-2-3-1-1-4 5.22 2 3 3 2.00 0.00
3-2-3-1-5-2-2 4.55 5 5 2 3.50 0.00
3-3-2-3-5-4-4 5.64 0 7 4 2.00 2.50
3-4-4-3-5-5-4 3.73 4  6  3  6.00 0.00
3-2-1-3-4-3-1  4.18  4  6  4   2.50  0.00
3-4-4-3-2-1-1  5.09  1  5  4  6.00  0.00
3-2-3-5-1-1  5.11 1  4  3  3.50  0.00
1-2-3-5-4-1-4  4.00  1  2  1  2.00 0.00
Averages:  4.69 2.25 4.75 3.00 3.44 0.31
Table 2.6 shows the associative chunk strength, I-anchor, F-anchor,
novelty, NFP, and similarity measures for each of these four groups.
Legal–initial and illegal–initial items differed only in terms of I-anchor (2.06
vs. 0.00, p < .05). Likewise, legal–final and illegal–final items differed only in
terms of F-anchor (2.50 vs. 0.31, p < .05). Legal–initial and legal–final items
were statistically identical across all measures (ps > .2). Illegal–initial and
illegal–final items differed in terms of both I-anchor (0.00 vs. 3.44, p < .001)
and F-anchor (2.50 vs. 0.31, p < .05). Thus, in terms of fragment information,
the only differences among the four groups of test sequences lies among the
dimensions of initial and final chunk anchor strengths. This means that we can
clearly examine differences in participants’ sensitivities to initial and final
fragment information across the three sensory modalities.
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Procedure
The overall procedure was similar to that of the previous experiments
but included an extra pretraining phase as well as a modified training task.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: tactile, visual,
auditory, tactile control, visual control, or auditory control. The three control
conditions were identical to their respective experimental conditions except
that the controls participated in the pretraining and test phases only.
All participants in the tactile conditions were assessed by the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) to determine their
preferred hand.
Pretraining phase. As already described, a separate group of participants
had participated in a simple discrimination task, which revealed that the
stimuli are easily discriminable across the modalities. To provide an
additional test of perceptual comparability, we incorporated the pretraining
phase into the current experiment. As an additional benefit, this procedure
also served to familiarize participants with the actual stimulus elements before
they were exposed to the training sequences.
Participants were informed that they would observe two stimuli, one
following the other. The stimuli consisted of vibration pulses, visual stimuli,
or tones, depending on the experimental condition. Participants were required
to judge how similar the two stimuli were to each other and give a rating
between 1 and 7, where 1 corresponded to most dissimilar and 7 to most
similar. Participants in the tactile conditions were told to base their ratings on
the vibration pulses’ proximity to each other, as all vibration pulses were
identical except for which fingers were stimulated. Similarly, participants in
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the visual conditions also were told to base their ratings on the stimuli’s
proximity, as the stimuli themselves were identical and differed only in terms
of where they were located. Participants in the auditory conditions were told
to base their ratings on the pitches of the tones.
Before the rating task began, participants were exposed to each of the
five possible stimuli, one at a time, so that they knew what the possible stimuli
were. Then they were presented with each of the 30 possible pairs listed in
Table 2.4, in random order for each participant. All stimuli were delivered for
a duration of 250 ms with a 250 ms pause occurring between the stimuli
within a pair. A prompt containing a reminder of the rating scheme appeared
on the screen, and the participant used the keyboard to give a numerical
response between 1 and 7. Following a 2-s pause after the rating was given,
the next stimulus pair was delivered.
Training phase. As in Experiment 1, the purpose of the training phase
was for the participants to attend to the legal training sequences without
explicit instruction that the sequences contained statistical regularities. On the
basis of pilot studies, we modified the training procedure slightly from
Experiment 1 in an attempt to equate training performance across the three
modalities.
At the beginning of the training phase, participants were instructed that
they would observe a particular sequence of stimuli and then, after a slight
pause, would observe two additional elements. The task was to decide
whether the pair of elements had occurred within the sequence in the same
order and then to press the appropriate key, Y for yes, N for no. The training
sequence–pair combinations from Table 2.5 were presented in random order
for three blocks, for a total of 72 training trials. Stimulus elements had a
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duration of 250 ms and were separated by 250-ms pauses. A 2-s pause
occurred between each sequence and each pair of elements. One second after
the last element of the stimulus pair occurred, a prompt was displayed on the
screen asking for the participant’s response. The next sequence–pair
combination began after a 2-s pause.
Test phase. The purpose of the test phase was to assess how well
participants learned the statistical regularities of the training set and could
generalize such knowledge to novel stimuli in a classification task. At the
beginning of the test phase, participants were instructed that all of the
sequences they had been exposed to in the previous phase of the experiment
were generated by a complex set of rules. They now would be exposed to new
sequences, presented in groups of two. One of the sequences in each pair was
generated by the same rules as before, whereas the other was not. The
participants’ task was to choose which sequence was generated from the same
rules by pressing a key marked 1 or 2, signifying the first or second sequence,
respectively. The test sequence pairs from Table 2.6 were presented in random
order for each participant. Stimulus elements had a duration of 250 ms and
were separated by 250-ms pauses. A 2-s pause occurred between the two
sequences of a pair. One second after the second sequence occurred, a prompt
was displayed on the screen asking for the participant’s response. The next
pair of sequences began following a 2-s pause.
Results
Pretraining Phase
We collected similarity ratings from all participants and averaged them
for each element pair combination to form three similarity matrices, one for
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each modality. Within each modality, the experimental and control ratings
were combined. We submitted each similarity matrix to a multiple
dimensional scaling (MDS) procedure (euclidian model) using SPSS 10.0 for
Windows. A one-dimensional solution provided a good fit for each of the
three modalities, with stress values less than 0.0500 in all cases (touch = 0.0056;
vision = 0.0086; audition = 0.0470). As can be seen from Figure 2.8, the tactile
and visual solutions contain clearly separated stimuli, in accord with the
linear relationship of the actual stimuli (e.g., the tactile vibration elements are
in the expected order, beginning with the thumb pulse, then the second finger,
then third finger). In slight contrast, the auditory solution contains two tones,
the third (261.6 Hz) and fourth (277.2 Hz), that are clustered together in state
space.
Figure 2.8. MDS solutions using the pretraining data for each of the
three sensory modalities. The numbers correspond to each of the five possible
stimulus elements for each modality.
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We interpret these MDS solutions as depicting that, overall, the stimuli
in the three modalities are perceived in psychologically similar ways. The only
noticeable difference is that two of the tones may have similar perceptual
representations.
Training Phase
The mean training performance out of 72 for each modality was 43.38
(60.3%) for tactile, 50.13 (69.6%) for visual, and 48.25 (67.0%) for auditory. The
data were submitted to a one-way ANOVA with the factor of modality. There
was a marginally significant main effect, F(2, 21) = 2.81, p = .083. Post hoc tests
revealed a significant difference between the tactile and visual training means
(p < .05). These results indicate that although the tactile training performance
was somewhat lower than the auditory and visual performances, in general,
scores across the three modalities were roughly equivalent.
Test Phase
The mean test scores out of 32 for each group were 15.75 for
tactile–control (49.2%), 16.00 for tactile–experimental (50.0%), 14.38 for
visual–control (44.9%), 15.88 for visual–experimental (49.6%), 15.25 for
auditory–control (47.6%), and 19.25 for auditory–experimental (60.2%). Figure
2.9 displays Experiment 2 test performance.
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Figure 2.9. Experiment 2: Mean number of correct test responses out of
32 (plus standard error) for the experimental (solid bars) and control (open
bars) groups. Sixteen is the level expected for chance performance.
Recall that the control groups participated in the pretraining and test
phases only. Therefore, the best way to assess learning within each sensory
modality is to compare experimental group performance with both
hypothetical chance levels (i.e., 50%) and control group performance (see
Redington & Chater, 1996). Individual single group t tests comparing
experimental group performance with theoretical chance reveal that only the
auditory group performed significantly better than chance, t(7) = 3.61, p < .01.
Likewise, paired t tests reveal that only the auditory experimental group
performed better than its control group, t(7) = 3.86, p < .01. These results
reveal that only the auditory experimental group learned the statistical
regularities of the training corpus.
We next submitted the experimental group data to a repeated-measures
ANOVA with the between-subjects factor of modality and the within-subject
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factor of initial versus final group sequences. We found a main effect of
modality, F(2, 21) = 4.95, p < .05, a main effect of initial–final group, F(2, 21) =
8.61, p < .01, and no interaction (p = .25). The effect of initial–final group arises
because test performance across modalities was generally better at initial
group sequences. The main effect of modality arises because the auditory
group was significantly better than both the tactile and the visual groups (ps <
0.05). Thus, these analyses confirm the presence of modality differences in
learners’ test performances.
The ANOVA revealed no interaction between modality and initial
versus final group sequences. However, because Experiment 1 suggested the
presence of such modality differences, we continued to explore possible
differences with planned comparisons. As described earlier, the test sequences
were created such that test pairs differed only in terms of I-anchor and F-
anchor measures. Thus, we can easily determine whether each sensory
modality was better at discriminating sequences on the basis of initial or final
fragment information. For the experimental group test performance in each
modality, we considered initial and final test pairs separately. Performance on
the 16 initial test pairs (i.e., test pairs consisting of one legal–initial and one
illegal–initial sequence) was 8.50 (53.1%) for touch, 9.50 (59.4%) for vision, and
10.13 (63.3%) for audition. We conducted a one-way ANOVA that revealed no
statistical differences among the three modalities, F(2, 21) = 1.69, p = .21.
Next, we consider performance on the 16 final test pairs for the
experimental conditions (i.e., test pairs consisting of one legal–final and one
illegal–final sequence). Performance was 7.50 (46.9%) for tactile, 6.38 (39.8%)
for visual, and 9.13 (57.0%) for auditory. An ANOVA revealed a main effect of
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modality, F(2, 21) = 3.98, p < .05. Specifically, auditory performance was
significantly better than visual performance (p < .05).
To summarize, the auditory group alone showed learning.
Furthermore, the auditory superiority appears to be largely due to better
performance, relative to vision and touch, on fragment–final test pairs. Thus,
consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 provides evidence for both
quantitative and qualitative learning differences across the senses.
Discussion
Experiment 2 more closely examined modality differences in statistical
learning by attempting to control for two variables that could have influenced
performance in Experiment 1: low-level perceptual factors and training
performance effects. We controlled the first variable by introducing a
pretraining phase, in which participants observed all combinations of element
pairs and gave similarity ratings for each. These ratings were then submitted
to an MDS analysis, and the results provide good indication that, across
modalities, the stimuli were represented similarly. Furthermore, an additional
control task revealed that the stimuli within each modality were easily
discriminated.
Even if the stimuli across all three conditions were comparable in terms
of their perceptibility, it is still possible that uneven training performances
could lead to differences in test performance. For example, in Experiment 1,
the auditory group’s training performance was significantly better than both
visual and tactile training performance. The improved training performance
may have led to better encoding of the relevant fragment information,
resulting in a better ability to classify novel sequences at test. For Experiment
61
2, we controlled training performance effects by using a training task that
resulted in relatively comparable training scores. This task proved more
difficult than that used in the first set of experiments, with scores ranging
between 60% and 69%. Auditory training performance was equivalent to
visual performance and only slightly better than tactile performance.
Even after we controlled for the perceptual and training effects,
auditory test performance still was significantly better than tactile and visual
performance. In fact, only the auditory group showed a main effect of
learning. Experiment 2 also shows that the auditory modality’s better
performance was due to a heightened sensitivity to sequence–final fragment
information.
Comparing the results of Experiment 2 with those of Experiment 1
reveals strong similarities. Both experiments showed an auditory advantage
for classifying novel sequences in regard to their legality. Both experiments
also revealed differences in terms of whether initial or final fragment
information was more important for each modality. The regression analyses in
the first set of experiments suggested a tactile–initial and an auditory–final
effect. The auditory–final effect was confirmed in Experiment 2.
One potentially troubling aspect of Experiment 2 is that there appeared
to be no tactile learning. This may be a result of the more complex grammar
and more difficult test that we used in Experiment 2. Tactile memory for serial
lists may be weaker compared with vision and audition (Mahrer & Miles,
1999) and, if so, may hinder learning during the training phase. The lack of
learning leaves open the possibility that the tactile learning we found in
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Experiment 1A was spurious. To replicate the tactile learning from
Experiment 1A, we conducted an additional tactile learning experiment.9
We hypothesized that using a slightly modified training scheme, one
that is less computationally demanding, might allow participants to better
encode the training regularities and lead to successful learning. Instead of a
training sequence being followed by a pair of elements (i.e., a bigram), each
training sequence was followed by a single element. The participants’ task
was to judge whether the single element had been a part of the preceding
sequence. In all other respects this additional experiment was identical to the
tactile condition in Experiment 2. On the training task, participants scored 62.2
out of 72 (86.4%), and on the test task they scored 18.63 out of 32 (58.2%). An
ANOVA (experimental vs. control) comparing the test performance with the
control performance revealed a significant effect, F(1, 14) = 5.83, p < .05. Thus,
under a slightly less complex training condition that allowed better training
performance, tactile participants showed a main effect of learning in the test
phase. This confirms the tactile learning we found in Experiment 1.
Finally, it could be argued that the superior performance in the
auditory condition was due to the presence of relative pitch information
present in the tone sequences (e.g., see Saffran & Griepentrog, 2001). Because
the auditory sequences can be construed as melodies, they contain
information about not just absolute pitch but also relative pitch in the form of
familiar musical intervals (e.g., perfect fourths and major sevenths). To
eliminate this information and provide an auditory task more comparable to
the other experiments, we conducted a new auditory experiment identical to
                                                 
9 Although there also was no effect of learning in Experiment 2’s visual condition, we did not
feel it was necessary to conduct an additional visual learning experiment because visual
statistical learning has been demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002).
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Experiment 2 but with a different tone set. The new tones were created so that
they would neither conform to standard musical notes nor contain standard
musical intervals between them. The tones, having frequencies of 210 Hz, 245
Hz, 286 Hz, 333 Hz, and 389 Hz, were equally spaced in log frequency, on the
basis of a ratio of 7/6 (1.166) and its powers 2, 3, and 4 (1.36, 1.59, 1.85,
respectively). Of these ratios, only one comes close to a musical interval, minor
6 (ratio 1.6), which is not a very prominent interval. With this new tone set,
participants scored 41.8 out of 72 (58.1%) on the training task and 18.7 out of
32 (58.4%) at test. The test scores were significantly greater than chance, t(9) =
3.69, p < .01, revealing an effect of learning. We also compared the test scores
with the original Experiment 2 auditory scores and found no difference, t(7) =
0.35, p = .74. Thus, this additional experiment indicates that the presence or
absence of musical interval information does not appear to affect learning and
therefore is not the underlying cause for the superior auditory performance.
General Discussion
Our experiments provided a controlled investigation into the nature of
statistical learning across the three primary sensory modalities. Unlike in
previous statistical learning forays, we used comparable materials and
identical procedures across the three senses. Additionally, in Experiment 2, we
controlled for low-level perceptual as well as training performance effects,
which allowed us to make direct comparisons among the modalities. In this
section we discuss the main findings of these experiments and conclude by
considering the underlying neural and cognitive mechanisms.
The first important finding is that touch can mediate statistical learning
of sequential input. Experiment 1A revealed that after very brief (10 min)
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exposure to training sequences produced from an artificial grammar,
participants were able to classify novel sequences as being either generated or
not generated from the same grammar. To our knowledge, no other studies
have demonstrated such a tactile learning ability, perhaps because of the belief
that deep structure learning is beyond the tactile sense’s capacity. Participants
did not perform above chance or control level performance in Experiment 2,
likely because the grammar was too complex and the distinction between legal
and illegal sequences more subtle. However, when we used a slightly less
demanding training scheme, participants displayed learning, which confirms
that touch can mediate the learning of an artificial grammar.
The tactile learning in both experiments occurred in the absence of
feedback and apparently without participants’ awareness. Additionally,
participants learned more than simply element frequencies, sequence lengths,
or beginning and ending element legality, as these factors were controlled;
rather, the legal and illegal test sequences differed in terms of adjacent
element statistics. The learning process observed here in the tactile domain is
conceptually similar to statistical learning found in the visual and auditory
modalities (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Saffran et al., 1999). Besides having
theoretical importance, these data may have practical implications in the
realm of communication devices for the visually or auditorily impaired, by
capitalizing on people’s ability to encode and represent tactile temporal order
statistics.
The second important finding is the presence of modality constraints
affecting statistical learning. These modality constraints took two main forms:
a quantitative effect, and a qualitative effect. The quantitative effect was
evidenced by the fact that auditory statistical learning was better than both
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tactile and visual learning. The auditory advantage occurred even after we
controlled for training performance and stimulus element perceptibility across
the modalities and eliminated standard musical intervals from the tone
sequences. Our results thus suggest that the modality constraints affected
learning itself rather than a lower level perceptual process that might have in
turn affected learning performance. Although previous research has pointed
to an auditory advantage for low-level temporal processing tasks (Mahar et
al., 1994; Sherrick & Cholewiak, 1986), our results appear to be some of the
first evidence that such an advantage extends to more complex processes,
namely statistical learning of sequential input.
In addition to the quantitative effect was a qualitative learning effect
that took the form of biases regarding which aspects of a sequence each
sensory system is more or less attuned toward. We found evidence that
learners of tactile sequences may have been more sensitive to fragment–initial
information, whereas learners of auditory material were more sensitive to
fragment–final information. These biases suggest that each sensory system
may apply slightly different computational strategies when processing
sequential input. The auditory–final bias is interesting because it mirrors the
modality effect in serial recall, in which a more pronounced recency effect (i.e.,
greater memory for items at the end of a list) is obtained with spoken as
compared with written lists (e.g., Crowder, 1986). This may indicate that
similar constraints affect both explicit encoding of serial material and implicit
learning of statistical structure. In both cases, learners appear to be more
sensitive to material at the end of sequences or lists for auditory input. It may
prove fruitful to further explore this hypothetical connection between serial
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list learning and implicit sequential learning; the results may inform research
in both domains, which have traditionally remained separate endeavors.
In contrast to the quantitative and qualitative effects we found, two
previous studies comparing auditory and visual statistical learning did not
report any modality differences. Fiser and Aslin (2002) found human visual
statistical learning of spatiotemporal sequences to be very similar to learning
in the auditory domain with temporal sequences (e.g., Aslin, Saffran, &
Newport, 1998) and in the visual domain with spatial structures (e.g., Fiser &
Aslin, 2001). Similarly, Kirkham et al. (2002) concluded that infant visual
statistical learning was similar to auditory learning (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996).
However, Fiser and Aslin’s (2002) and Kirkham et al.’s (2002) conclusions
were based on studies that did not use comparable stimuli or procedures
across the modalities. Thus, neither of these two studies are adequate for
making fine-tuned cross-modal comparisons. We agree that there are
similarities in how infants and adults learn sequential patterns across vision
and audition, but our data reveal important differences, as well. Saffran (2002)
used more comparable procedures and stimuli in her visual and auditory
AGL experiments and found comparable overall learning performances across
modalities. However, a subtle modality difference was revealed, showing that
auditory learners were more sensitive to the presence or absence of predictive
dependencies in the grammar, perhaps because they had more experience in
the auditory domain for tracking such sequential structure.
Similarly, it could be argued that the auditory learning advantage we
observed was merely due to participants having more prior experience
listening to tone sequences compared with feeling vibration pulses or tracking
visual spatiotemporal patterns. However, if this was the case, one would
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expect the auditory training performance levels to be substantially better than
visual or tactile scores. In fact, auditory training performance was lower than
visual performance in Experiment 2. Additionally, it is difficult to see how
previous training exposure would lead to the qualitative differences we
observed in terms of each sensory modality being differentially biased toward
the beginning or ending of sequences.
If, as we suggest, modality constraints exist, what might be their
nature? The answer clearly depends on how one views statistical or implicit
learning itself. Because most researchers have tended to emphasize the
similarities existing between statistical learning in various domains, this has
led to implicit assumptions—or, in some cases, explicit statements (Kirkham et
al., 2002)—depicting statistical learning as a single, domain-general
mechanism. If this view is adopted, modality constraints are seen as
influencing the processing of input sequences before the information is
funneled into the presumed amodal statistical learning mechanism, allowing
some types of input to be processed more or less efficiently.
Another view of statistical learning is that it is made up of various
subsystems, each operating over different types of input and subserved by
different brain areas. This view is supported by increasing evidence that
unimodal brain areas contribute to the learning of statistical patterns. For
example, in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study (Reber, Stark, &
Squire, 1998), subjects learned to categorize visual patterns in terms of
whether the patterns were similar to a previously seen corpus. It was found
that occipital cortex (V1, V2) was instrumental for learning the structural
regularities of the patterns, apart from being involved in visual perception
itself. Similarly, Molchan, Sunderland, McIntosh, Herscovitch, and Schreuers
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(1994) found the primary auditory cortex to be involved in auditory
associative learning. These studies indicate that relatively low-level unimodal
sensory areas play an important role in learning environmental statistical
regularities. It is our view that implicit statistical learning may be akin to
perceptual priming, where modality-specific brain areas mediate learning by
becoming more fluent at processing previously observed stimuli and/or
stimuli that contain similar statistical properties as those viewed earlier (also
see Chang & Knowlton, 2004). Within this framework, modality constraints
may reflect general processing differences that exist among the various
statistical learning subsystems, with the auditory system excelling at encoding
statistical relations among temporal elements and the visual system
specializing primarily in computing spatial relationships.
In conclusion, we have presented new evidence revealing both
similarities and differences in statistical learning across the senses. An
important target for future research is to uncover to what extent these
modality constraints are related to previous reports of modality differences in
perception and cognition. We anticipate that future studies, involving a
combination of cognitive and neurophysiological methods, will further
illuminate the nature of modality-constrained statistical learning across the
senses.
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CHAPTER THREE
Seeing and Hearing in Space and Time:
Effects of Modality and Presentation Rate on Implicit Statistical
Learning
Intuitively, each sensory modality seems biased to handle particular
aspects of environmental input.  For instance, vision and audition appear to be
most adept at processing spatial and temporal input, respectively (Kubovy,
1988). Consider that it takes very little time – often a single glance – in order to
recognize a relatively complex visual scene (Potter, 1976) but it generally takes
several seconds or longer to recognize a melody or voice.  That is, a brief
“snapshot” of sound is fairly incomprehensible whereas a visual snapshot
may be quite coherent (Seifritz, Espoto, Neuhoff, & Di Salle, 2003). Also
consider that whereas the auditory system must compute the location of
sounds through differences in intensity and time of arrival at each ear, the
location of visual stimuli is directly mapped onto the retina and then projected
topographically into cortical areas (Bushara et al., 1999). This somewhat
anecdotal evidence, bolstered by studies of perception and memory, suggests
that in visual cognition, the dimensions of space weigh most heavily, whereas
for audition, the temporal dimension is most prominent (Friedes, 1974;
Geldard, 1970; Kubovy, 1988; O’Connor & Hermelin, 1978; Penney, 1989).
These modality constraints have been proposed to affect the manner in
which stimuli are perceived (Mahar, Mackenzie, & McNicol, 1994; Repp &
Penel, 2002), learned (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Handel & Buffardi, 1969;
Saffran, 2002), and maintained in working memory (Collier & Logan, 2000;
Glenberg & Swanson, 1986; Penney, 1989). Even so, researchers do not always
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give modality effects due attention.  In fact, it has been suggested that
cognitive psychologists ought not to consider the senses as separate entities at
all (e.g., Marks, 1978; Stoffregen & Bardy, 2001). Or at the very least, modality
effects ought to be de-emphasized, with an emphasis instead on the
importance of amodal information in the environment that can be detected by
any of the sense modalities (e.g., Gibson, 1966). Unfortunately, these views
tend to obfuscate the possible presence of modality differences that may affect
processing, which can hinder the development of a complete theory of human
cognition.
It is currently unknown to what extent spatial and temporal constraints
affect statistical learning, the capability for extracting environmental
regularities, largely through automatic learning mechanisms operating
outside of awareness. Statistical learning is a fundamental ability believed to
underlie important aspects of language and cognition (Altmann, 2002;
Conway & Christiansen, 2001), including speech segmentation (Saffran,
Newport, & Aslin 1996) visual scene computations (Fiser & Aslin, 2001), and
tactile pattern processing (Conway & Christiansen, 2005). Very few studies of
statistical learning have directly compared learning across sensory domains;
fewer still have considered possible spatial and temporal constraints on
learning. One exception is Gomez (1997), who suggested that visual learning
of artificial grammars proceeds better when the stimulus elements are
presented simultaneously – that is, spatially arrayed – rather than
sequentially, presumably because a simultaneous format permits better
chunking of the stimulus elements. Likewise, Saffran (2002) found that
participants learned predictive relationships best with an auditory or visual-
simultaneous presentation, but did poorly in a visual-sequential condition.
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Finally, more recently Conway and Christiansen (2005) examined statistical
learning of tactile, visual, and auditory input sequences and found that
auditory learning of such material exceeded both visual and tactile learning.
In this report, we extend these studies to directly test the hypothesis
that temporal and spatial constraints affect visual and auditory learning of
statistical patterns. Using the artificial grammar learning (AGL; Reber, 1967)
paradigm, we expose participants to statistically-governed visual or auditory
input sequences generated from an artificial grammar and then test learners
on their ability to generalize their knowledge to novel patterns.  Our primary
manipulation is the manner in which the visual input is distributed: spatially,
spatiotemporally, or temporally.  In line with a modality-constrained view, we
predict that learning will be greatest for the visual-spatial input, comparable
to an auditory (temporal) condition, and poorest for the visual-temporal
material.  An additional aim of this study is to explore the effect that rate of
presentation has on learning, an issue that has not yet been explored in AGL
or traditional statistical learning tasks.  Faster presentation rates may magnify
the effect of modality constraints by adversely affecting learning in the non-
preferred mode of processing (see Collier & Logan, 2002). Consequently, we
predict that at the fast rate, learning in the visual-temporal condition will
show the largest decrement in performance.
Experiment 3: Effects of Modality and Presentation Rate on Learning
In Experiment 3, we manipulated presentation format and presentation
rate to uncover additional constraints on visual and auditory implicit
statistical learning.
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Method
Subjects
One hundred forty-four subjects (twelve in each condition) with normal
hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from
psychology classes at Cornell University, earning course credit for their
participation. Data from two subjects were discarded, one due to the
participant being color blind and the other due to experimenter error.
Materials
The materials are similar to those used by Conway and Christiansen
(2005). Figure 3.1 shows the artificial grammar used to generate the input
sequences, taken from Gomez and Gerken (1999). The grammar consists of
five unique elements, each represented by a numeral (1-5). In turn, each
numeral is mapped onto elements from one of four visual or auditory
vocabularies, corresponding to four input conditions (auditory, visual-
temporal, visual-spatial, and visual-spatiotemporal).
As in Conway and Christiansen (2005), for the “training” phase we
used 12 legal sequences that were generated from the grammar. Each legal
sequence was used twice to create a set of 12 training pairs (see Table 3.1). Six
of the pairs consisted of the same training sequence presented twice (matched
pairs), whereas the other 6 pairs consisted of 2 different sequences
(mismatched pairs). These matched and mismatched training pairs were used
in conjunction with a same–different judgment task.
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Figure 3.1. Artificial grammar used in Experiment 3, taken from Gomez
and Gerken (1999). Each numeral was mapped onto a particular auditory or
visual stimulus element, depending on the condition.
Table 3.1
Training Pairs
_____________________________________________________               
Matched Pairs                                              Mismatched Pairs                
1-2-1-1-1-3 / 1-2-1-1-1-3 1-2-3-5-2-5 / 1-2-3-5-2-3
4-1-1-3-5-2 / 4-1-1-3-5-2 1-2-3-5-2-3 / 1-2-3-5-2-5
4-1-3-5-2 / 4-1-3-5-2 4-3-5-2-3 / 4-3-5-2-5
1-2-5-5-5 / 1-2-5-5-5 4-3-5-2-5 / 4-3-5-2-3
4-1-3 / 4-1-3 1-2-5-5 / 1-2-1-3
1-2-3 / 1-2-3 1-2-1-3 / 1-2-5-5
Note.  The numbers refer to a particular visual or auditory stimulus (see text).
1
2 4
53
4
5
1
2
1
2
3
Start
Exit
Exit
5
S2
S1
S3
S4
S5
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The test set consisted of 10 novel legal and 10 illegal sequences. Legal
sequences were produced from the finite-state grammar in the normal fashion.
The illegal sequences each begin with a legal element (i.e., 1 or 4), followed by
one or more illegal transitions and ending with a legal element (i.e., 2, 3, or 5).
For example, the illegal sequence 1-4-5-1-3-3 begins and ends with legal
elements (1 and 3, respectively) but contains several illegal interior transitions
not allowed by the grammar (1-4, 4–5, 5–1, and 3-3). The legal and illegal
sequences can be described as differing from one another in terms of co-
occurrence statistics of adjacent elements. That is, a statistical learning
mechanism could discern which novel test sequences are illegal by noting the
presence of pairwise element combinations that did not occur in the training
set. All test sequences are listed in Table 3.2.
As mentioned earlier, each of the five stimulus elements (1-5) were
mapped onto one of four vocabularies, corresponding to four types of
modality/format. Importantly, the timing of all stimuli was equated across
these four conditions in order to make comparisons across conditions viable.
Auditory. For the auditory conditions, the stimulus elements consisted
of pure tones of various frequencies (1 = 261.6 Hz, 2 = 277.2 Hz, 3 = 349.2 Hz, 4
= 370 Hz, and 5 = 493.9 Hz) corresponding to musical notes C, C#, F, F#, and
B, respectively, played through headphones. For the “slow” and “fast” input
conditions, each stimulus element (tone) had durations of 250 ms and 125 ms,
respectively. As an example, the sequence 1-2-1-3 consists of the following
four notes in this order: C, C#, C, and F.
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Table 3.2
Test Items
______________________________________________________               
Legal              IAS      FAS                 Illegal             IAS      FAS                 
4-1-3-5-2-3 2.5 2.5 1-4-5-1-3-3 0 0
1-2-1-3-5-2 4.5 2.0 4-5-1-2-1-3 0 2.0
4-3-5-2-5-5 2.0 1.5 4-2-1-3-1-5 0 0
4-1-3-5-2-5 2.5 2.0 1-5-3-3-2-2 0 0
4-1-1-1-3 2.0 2.0 1-5-3-4-2 0 0
1-2-1-1-3 4.5 2.0 4-2-1-5-3 0 0
1-2-3-5-2 5.0 2.0 1-5-3-1-2 0 0
4-1-1-3 2.0 2.0 4-5-1-3 0 1.5
4-3-5-2 2.0 2.0 4-5-2-2 0 0
1-2-5 4.5 1.0 1-4-2 0 0
_____________________________________________________               
Note: The numbers refer to a particular visual or auditory stimulus (see text).
IAS = initial anchor strength; FAS = final anchor strength.
Visual-temporal. For the visual-temporal conditions, the stimulus
elements consisted of different colored squares (1=red, 2=blue, 3=yellow,
4=green, 5=black) appearing sequentially in the center of the computer screen
at approximately eye level.  Each square (2.6 cm x 2.6 cm) appeared for 250 ms
in the “slow” input condition and 125 ms in the “fast” condition. Thus, the
sequence 1-2-1-3 consists of a temporal sequence of red, blue, red, and yellow
squares (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Example of visual-temporal sequence 1-2-1-3. The arrow
designates the flow of time. Note that participants did not see the labels for
each color; they are included here only for illustrative purposes.
Visual-spatial. For the visual-spatial conditions, the stimulus elements
consisted of the same colored squares described above, except that all squares
in a sequence were presented simultaneously along a horizontal row, from left
to right, at approximately eye level. The timing of the stimuli was equal to the
cumulative presentation time of the visual-temporal stimuli. That is, in the
slow condition, a visual-spatial sequence was displayed for a number of msec
equal to 250 x N, where N is the number of squares in the sequence. For the
fast condition, a sequence was displayed for 125 x N ms. Thus, the visual-
spatial sequence 1-2-1-3 consists of a row of squares appearing simultaneously
(yellow)
(red)
(blue)
(red)
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for (250 x 4) = 1000 ms or (125 x 4) = 500 ms, from left to right: red, blue, red,
yellow (see Figure 3.3).
Visual-spatiotemporal. The visual-spatiotemporal conditions were
designed to include both temporal and spatial information in each sequence.
Each stimulus element consisted of a black square, displayed on the computer
monitor in different locations (element 1 represents the leftmost location, and
5 the rightmost). Each black square (2.6 × 2.6 cm) was positioned in a
horizontal row across the middle of the screen at approximately eye level,
with 2.5 cm separating each position.  Each element appeared for 250 ms or
125 ms, depending on the presentation rate condition. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
visual-spatiotemporal sequence 1-2-1-3.
Figure 3.3. Example of visual-spatial sequence 1-2-1-3. Note that
participants did not see the labels for each color; they are included here only
for illustrative purposes.
         (red)     (blue)    (red)   (yellow)
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Figure 3.4. Example of visual-spatiotemporal sequence 1-2-1-3. The
arrow designates the flow of time. Note that participants did not see the
dashed squares, which are included here only for illustrative purposes.
Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to one of twelve conditions, four
control groups and eight experimental groups. Within the experimental
groups, the 4 x 2 design consisted of two factors: Modality/Format (auditory,
visual-temporal, visual-spatial, and visual-spatiotemporal) and Presentation
Rate (slow and fast). The slow and fast groups received the input material at a
presentation rate of 4 and 8 elements per second, respectively (corresponding
to individual element durations of 250 ms and 125 ms).
The four control groups consisted of the four different
Modality/Format conditions; all control groups received the input at the slow
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presentation rate only.10 The control groups were meant to ensure that any
learning that the experimental groups displayed was dependent upon the
exposure to the input material in the training phase.  Consequently, the
experimental groups received both training and test phases whereas the
control groups received the test phase only.
At the beginning of the training phase, the slow and fast experimental
group participants were instructed that they would hear or see pairs of
sequences. For each pair of sequences (listed in Table 3.1), they had to decide
whether the two sequences were the same or not and indicate their decision
by pressing a button marked YES or NO. This match–mismatch paradigm,
also used by Conway and Christiansen (2005), served as a way to encourage
participants to pay attention to the stimuli without giving them explicit
instruction that the sequences conformed to an underlying structure. Note that
there is no feedback given during the task.
Each pair was presented six times in random order for a total of 72
exposures, with the timing parameters described earlier. In all conditions, a 2-
s pause occurred between the two sequences of each pair and following the
last sequence of the pair. After exposure to the two sequences, a prompt was
displayed on the computer monitor asking for the participant’s response, and
it stayed on the screen until a button press was made. After another 2-s pause,
the next training pair was presented. The entire training phase in each
condition lasted roughly 10 min for each participant.
Before the beginning of the test phase, the experimental group
participants were told that the sequences they had just observed had been
                                                 
10 We only incorporated the slow presentation rate for the control groups because, assuming
that the control groups would perform at chance levels, there is no reason to believe that
increasing the rate of presentation would change performance levels.
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generated by a computer program that determined the order of the stimuli by
using a complex set of rules. They were told that they would now be
presented with new sequences. Some of these would be generated by the same
program, whereas others would not be. It was the participant’s task to observe
each of the new sequences and then classify it without feedback in terms of
whether it was generated by the same rules by pressing a button marked
either YES or NO. The control participants, who did not participate in the
training phase, received an identical test task.
The 20 test sequences were presented one at a time, in random order, to
each participant. The timing of the test sequences was the same as that used
during the training phase (250-ms or 125-ms pulse durations and 2-s pauses
before and after each sequence).
Results
The training performances for the eight experimental groups are shown
in Table 3.3, which reports the mean number of correct match/mismatch
decisions out of 72. We submitted the data to a two-way ANOVA with the
factors Modality/Format and Presentation Rate. There was a main effect of
Modality/Format, F(3,88) = 26.1, p < .0001 but no main effect of Presentation
Rate, F(1,88) = .28, p = .60, nor a significant interaction, F(3,88) = .55, p = .55.
Recall that the training task was merely meant to encourage participants’
attention to the training stimuli and thus comparisons of performance
between different conditions is of minimal importance for our purposes. The
data of more interest are the test classification results, which provide a
measure of the extent to which participants can extract statistical regularities
and generalize this knowledge to novel patterns.
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Table 3.3
Experimental Group Training Results
                                                                                                                                    
Slow (4 elements/s)             Fast (8 elements/s)   
Modality/Format                M        %                                M        %                    
Auditory 49.4 68.7 50.4 70.0
Visual-Temporal 44.1 61.3 42.8 59.4
Visual-Spatial 47.3 65.8 48.7 67.6
Visual-Spatiotemporal 40.8 56.6 41.5 57.7
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Mean values reported out of 72 possible correct.
The control group test results are shown in Table 3.4, which reports the
mean number of correct classification responses out of 20. As expected, none
of the four groups performed greater than chance levels, thus indicating that
any learning displayed by the experimental groups is due to exposure to the
material during the training phase.11
                                                 
11 The visual-spatiotemporal control group actually performed statistically worse than chance,
indicating that the visual-spatiotemporal experimental groups might be biased against an
effect of learning.
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Table 3.4
Control Group Test Results
                                                                                                
Modality/Format                M        %         t(11)                
Auditory 10.8 54.2 1.76
Visual-Temporal 9.9 49.6 0.16
Visual-Spatial 9.3 46.7 -0.83
Visual-Spatiotemporal 8.1 40.4 -2.73*
                                                                                                
Note. Mean values reported out of 20 possible correct. T-tests are conducted
with respect to chance levels.
*p < .05
The experimental group test results are shown in Table 3.5 and
displayed graphically in Figure 3.5. Notice first that the auditory, visual-
temporal, and visual-spatial groups all evidenced learning above chance levels
in the slow presentation conditions. Notice, too that only the visual-temporal
group’s performance declined at the fast presentation rate, dropping to chance
levels.
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Table 3.5
Experimental Group Test Results
                                                                                                                                    
Slow (4 elements/s)             Fast (8 elements/s)   
Modality/Format                M        %         t(11)                M        %         t(11)    
Auditory 13.9 69.5 5.42*** 14.3 71.7 6.28***
Visual-Temporal 12.2 60.8 3.17** 10.4 52.1 0.92
Visual-Spatial 13.1 65.4 3.39** 12.6 62.9 3.11**
Visual-Spatiotemporal 10.9 54.6 1.35 11.5 57.5 3.00*
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Mean values reported out of 20 possible correct. T-tests are conducted
with respect to chance levels.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
Figure 3.5. Experimental group test performances, showing number of
correct test items out of 20, and including error bars.
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We submitted the experimental group data to a two-way ANOVA with
the factors Modality/Format and Presentation Rate. There was a main effect of
Modality/Format, F(3,88) = 7.96; p < .0001, but no main effect of Presentation
Rate, F(1,88) = 0.40; p = .52, nor a significant interaction, F(3,88) = 1.18; p = .32.
We continued with planned comparisons between the four different
modality/formats, collapsed across presentation rate. The results revealed
that auditory performance was significantly greater than both visual-temporal
(p < .0001) and visual-spatiotemporal performance (p < .001), as well as
marginally greater than visual-spatial performance (p = .067). Visual-spatial
performance in turn was significantly greater than both visual-temporal (p <
.05) and visual-spatiotemporal performance (p < .05). There were no
differences between the visual-temporal and visual-spatiotemporal groups (p
= .91). We also conducted planned comparisons within each modality/format
between the slow and fast conditions. Confirming our earlier observation,
only the visual-temporal group showed a difference in test performance,
scoring significantly lower at the fast presentation rate (p < .05).
These results suggest quantitative learning differences between sense
modalities. In order to detect more subtle modality-specific learning
differences, we conducted item analyses to determine whether particular test
items were more or less difficult to classify in each modality/format. We
conducted two separate two-way ANOVA’s (Modality/Format x Test Item),
one for each rate of presentation, entering the test performance data averaged
across subjects for each test item. For the slow presentation rate, there were
main effects both of Test Item, F(19, 880) = 3.47, p < .0001, and
Modality/Format, F(3, 880) = 4.53, p < .01, but no interaction, F(57, 880) = 1.17,
p = .19. For the fast presentation rate, there also were main effects for Test
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Item, F(19, 880) = 3.39, p < .0001, and Modality/Format, F(3, 880) = 8.18, p <
.0001, as well as a significant interaction, F(57, 880) = 2.14, p = .001.
The significant interaction in the item analysis for the fast presentation
conditions suggests that there exist learning-related qualitative modality
effects. We followed up with regression analyses to determine which sources
of information may have been extracted by each modality/format condition.
Each of the legal and illegal test items were assessed in terms of their initial
and final anchor strengths (IAS and FAS), an indication of the relative
frequencies of the initial and final fragment “chunks” (i.e., bi- and tri-grams)
that exist in similar positions in the training items (Conway & Christiansen,
2005). For example, the test item 1-2-1-3-5-2 has an IAS of 4.5 and an FAS of
2.0, indicating that the initial chunks 1-2, 2-1, and 1-2-1 occur frequently in the
initial positions of the training set, whereas the final chunks 3-5, 5-2, and 3-5-2
occur slightly less frequently in the final positions of the training set.12  We
used IAS, FAS, and item length as predictors in four different multiple
regression analyses, one for each modality/format condition (each collapsed
across presentation rate). The results of the multiple regression analyses
should indicate which of these three measures best predicts whether a
participant in each modality/format condition will endorse a test item as
legal. The results reveal a striking difference between the auditory and the
visual conditions: FAS was a significant predictor for auditory endorsements
(p < .005), whereas IAS was a significant and marginally significant predictor
                                                 
12 In Conway and Christiansen (2005), we assessed these stimuli in terms of additional
information sources, such as novelty (Redington & Chater, 1996), novel fragment position
(Johnstone & Shanks, 1999), and similarity (Vokey & Brooks, 1992), but found that for this
particular test and training set, these measures were highly correlated with IAS and FAS. A
principle components analysis revealed that all these sources could be efficiently reduced to
IAS, FAS, and item length. Therefore, we include only those three measures in the regression
analyses.
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for visual-spatial (p < .05) and visual-temporal endorsements (p = .09),
respectively. Length was a significant and marginally significant predictor for
visual-spatial (p < .05) and visual-temporal endorsements (p = .087),
respectively. It is important to note that there are no length differences
between legal and illegal items. Thus, participants in the visual-spatial and
visual-temporal conditions apparently were partially relying on an incorrect
strategy to guide their test classifications.
In summary, for the experimental group test data, there was a main
effect of modality/format, with auditory performance greatest, closely
followed by visual-spatial performance, and with the visual-temporal and
visual-spatiotemporal groups performing worst. We also found that at the fast
presentation rate, only visual-temporal performance suffered. These
quantitative learning differences were accompanied by qualitative learning
effects. Consistent with previous results (Conway & Christiansen, 2005),
audition and vision were differentially biased toward the end and beginning
of input sequences, respectively.
These results provide key support for a modality-constrained view of
statistical learning. Participants in the visual conditions appeared to best
extract statistical patterns when the input was presented in a spatial format
rather than a temporal or spatiotemporal one. Additionally, visual learning
relied upon statistical information present at the beginning of input sequences.
In contrast, auditory learning excelled in the encoding of temporal input,
mediated by greater sensitivity to the statistical structure of the end of input
sequences. Furthermore, the quantitative modality constraints were magnified
at the highest presentation rate, with visual-temporal learning dropping in
94
overall performance, highlighting the fact that vision is poor at encoding
temporal regularities, especially at fast presentation rates.
General Discussion
The modality constraints observed here extend the results of Conway
and Christiansen (2005), who found that auditory statistical learning of
sequential structure exceeded that of visual or tactile learning, as well as that
of Saffran (2002), who found that learning of predictive relationships occurred
better for visual-simultaneous and auditory input compared to visual-
sequential material. In the current study, visual learning nearly matched
auditory learning but only when the visual regularities were presented in a
simultaneous/spatial format. These results illustrate that the extraction of
statistical patterns is heavily affected by the modality and presentation format
in which the input is delivered. Furthermore, we found that increasing the
rate of presentation magnified these modality constraints, causing a decline in
learning performance for the visual-temporal condition but not for the other
formats.
These data suggest that a full understanding of statistical learning, and
likely other forms of perception, learning, and memory, will only be borne out
by taking into account effects of modality in relation to the dimensions of
space and time. The empirical evidence supports what we call a modality-
constrained view of perception and cognition.  That is, consistent with previous
work in perception (Mahar et al., 1994), learning (Saffran, 2002), and short-
term memory (Penney, 1989), we suggest that performance on particular tasks
will vary depending on the sensory modality and the input format (i.e.,
spatial, temporal, or spatiotemporal) in question.
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Before attempting to further clarify the nature of this modality-
constrained view, it is worthwhile to consider possible objections. Although
the modality effects reviewed here and elsewhere appear to be substantial and
robust, there also exist commonalities between visual and auditory processing
(e.g., Kubovy & Van Valkenburg, 2001; Marks, 1978). Both vision and audition
can localize stimuli in space, can detect movement, can perceive rhythms and
sequential patterns, and can discriminate objects based on when they
occurred.  As the Gibsons (1966; 1969) argued, such environmental
information might be “amodal” in the sense that these and other features can
be picked up across multiple sense modalities.  If so, then different stimulus
energies could be considered to be equivalent, or invariant, to one another.
Similarly, Marks (1978) argued that the sense modalities have much in
common in terms of phenomenological attributes, principles, and
mechanisms. As he suggested, it is likely that the auditory and visual systems
rely upon many of the same computational algorithms and neural
architectures (see Shamma, 2001). From these perspectives, perhaps the vision-
space, audition-time analogy is misleading (Handel, 1988).
We agree that it may be misleading to consider vision solely within a
spatial framework and audition as existing only within a temporal one.
However, there appear to be real biases in terms of which dimensions are
more or less important for each modality.  From a purely phenomenological
perspective, it seems nearly impossible to imagine an a-temporal sound or a
non-spatial visual percept.  On the other hand, it is easier to think of sound
without space or a visual scene without the passage of time.  Time appears to
be the primary gridwork for audition, with sounds changing in certain ways
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over time, whereas space is the primary referent for vision, with visual objects
defined by size and shape (Hirsh, 1967).
More importantly, the empirical data shown here and elsewhere (e.g.,
Friedes, 1974) act as a counter-argument to the possibility of amodal cognitive
processes.  As Barsalou (1999) argued, modality differences make it difficult to
cling to amodal theories of perception and cognition.  Though it may be true
that both vision and audition can perceive the invariant structure of certain
features such as temporal patterns or object locations, nevertheless, each sense
appears to be differentially adept at detecting a subset of stimulus
characteristics, including temporal and spatial statistical patterns.
Thus, however much the sensory systems may be similar, it is clear that
certain constraints affect their processing, and therefore it is important to
understand what causes the constraints.  Within the context of verbal short-
term memory, Penney (1989) suggested that auditory and visual stimuli are
processed in separate “streams” with each having different properties and
capabilities.  The auditory stream is characterized by strong associations
between successive/sequential items, whereas the visual stream encodes
associations between simultaneously presented spatial input.  This makes
sense in light of what is known about the principles of auditory grouping:
sounds that rapidly follow one another tend to be produced by the same
environmental source and thus are perceived or “grouped” together, whereas
it is spatial rather than temporal contiguity which is important for visual
perception (Goldstein, 2002).  Possibly, a similar associative neural learning
mechanism may be operative in both the auditory and visual cortical areas,
but each makes its computations over a different set of input. The existence of
similar underlying computational principles helps explain the processing
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similarities across the modalities, while the proposed separate processing
streams allow for the existence of modality-specific differences. Under this
framework, visual mechanisms might associate features and/or objects that
are close together in terms of their location along the retinotopic map (i.e., in
terms of space).  Auditory mechanisms would encode relations among events
occurring close together in time.
This modality-constrained framework helps explain the current data.
First, the data revealed that subjects were best able to encode statistical
regularities contained within visual input when the material was presented
spatially, rather than spatiotemporally or temporally.  In contrast, subjects
excelled at the processing of auditory input (presented temporally),
outperforming all other visual conditions.  Second, when the input stream was
presented at relatively fast rates (8 elements per second), modality effects were
magnified: subjects in the visual-temporal condition suffered a substantial
decrement in performance.
The differences in the initial/final sensitivities by vision and audition
were also observed previously (Conway & Christiansen, 2005). It is important
to note that for the current stimulus set, both fragment-initial and fragment-
final information are equally helpful for making correct classification
judgments; thus, it isn’t likely that the observed qualitative sensitivity biases
are due to experiment-specific learning. Instead, it is more likely that learners
come into the experiment with pre-existing auditory-final and visual-initial
encoding biases. Interestingly, similar modality initial/final effects are seen in
the realm of serial recall (i.e., serial position effects) with audition showing
better recall for the end of lists (Crowder, 1986) and under certain
circumstances, vision showing better recall for the beginning of lists (Beaman,
98
2002). Thus, there may exist a global perceptual/cognitive constraint on vision
and audition, evolved through currently unknown selection pressures, to
differentially attend to information in initial and final sequence positions,
respectively.
As others have argued (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Penney, 1989;
Tulving & Madigan, 1970), understanding the role played by the sensory
systems is key to having a full theory of human memory and perception, and
any theory of cognition will not be adequate if it cannot account for modality-
specific phenomena. Our data shed light on one important modality
constraint: implicit statistical learning is heavily constrained by the sense
modality and presentation format in which the patterns occur. These
constraints suggest that auditory and visual statistical learning occurs in
separate, modality-specific streams, each having different biases and
properties. Additional research must further elucidate the nature of each
modality-constrained learning system and how they support human cognition
more broadly.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Statistical Learning Within and Between Modalities:
Pitting Abstract Against Stimulus-Specific Representations
A core debate in the psychological sciences is to what extent acquired
knowledge consists of modality-dependent versus abstract or amodal
representations. Traditional information processing approaches to cognition
have emphasized the operation of amodal symbol systems (Fodor, 1975;
Pylyshyn, 1984), whereas more recently, the “embodiment” approach
proposes instead that cognition is grounded in modality-specific sensorimotor
mechanisms (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey & Wilson, 2003;
Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff 1988). This debate has especially come to a head in the
area of implicit statistical learning of artificial grammars.13 In Arthur Reber’s
(1967; 1969) early work, letter strings were generated from an artificial
grammar. Because the strings obeyed the overall rule structure of the
grammar, they were constrained in terms of what letters could follow other
letters. Participants not only showed evidence of learning this structure
“implicitly”, but they could apparently transfer their knowledge of the legal
regularities from one letter vocabulary (e.g., M, R, T, V, X) to another (e.g., N,
P, S, W, Z) as long as the same underlying grammar was used for both (Reber,
1969). This effect has been replicated many times, with transfer being
demonstrated not just across letter sets (e.g., Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Mathews
                                                 
13 Artificial grammar learning is “statistical” in the sense that successful test performance can
be achieved by encoding something akin to chunks of elements (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) or
learning the transitional probabilities among consecutive elements (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, &
Newport, 1999).
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et al., 1989; Shanks, Banbury, & Henry, 1997) but also across sense modalities
(Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995; Manza & Reber, 1997; Tunney & Altmann,
2001). Both adults and infants have displayed successful transfer (Gomez &
Gerken, 1999; Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999).
The usual way to explain transfer effects in artificial grammar learning
(AGL) tasks is by proposing that the learning is based on “abstract”
knowledge, that is, knowledge not directly tied to the surface features or
sensory instantiation of the stimuli (Altmann et al., 1995; Marcus et al., 1999;
Pena, Bonatti, Nespor, & Mehler, 2002; Reber,1989; 1993; Shanks et al., 1997).
For instance, the human cognitive system might encode patterns among
stimuli in terms of “abstract algebraic-like rules” that encode relationships
between amodal variables (Marcus et al., 1999, p. 79). Such a proposal
emphasizes the structural relationships among items and deemphasizes
information pertaining to specific features of the stimulus elements (see Reber,
1993, pp. 120-121). Alternatively, instead of abstract knowledge, participants
may be learning the statistical structure of the input sequences in a modality-
or stimulus-specific manner (e.g., Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Christiansen &
Curtin, 1999; Conway & Christiansen, 2005; McClelland & Plaut, 1999;
Perruchet, Tyler, Galland, & Peereman, 2004; Seidenberg & Elman, 1999).
In this chapter, we present new evidence from a set of AGL experiments
supporting a modality-constrained or embodied view of statistical learning.
We introduce a novel modification of the AGL paradigm to examine the nature
of statistical learning within and across modalities. We used two different
finite-state grammars in a dual–grammar cross-over design such that the
grammatical test sequences of one grammar were used as the ungrammatical
test sequences for the other grammar. For example, in Experiment 4,
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participants were exposed to visual sequences of one grammar and auditory
sequences from the other grammar. In the test phase, they observed new
grammatical sequences from both grammars, half generated from one
grammar and half from the other. Crucially, for each participant, all test items
from both grammars were instantiated only visually or only aurally. This
cross-over design allows us to make the following prediction. If participants
learn the abstract rules underlying both grammars, they ought to classify all
sequences as equally grammatical (by our scoring scheme, achieving 50%
performance). However, if they learn statistical regularities specific to the sense
modality in which they were instantiated, participants ought to classify a
sequence as grammatical only if the sense modality and grammar are matched
appropriately, leading to above-chance performance. To preview, the data
from these experiments suggest that learners encoded the sequential patterns
and generalized their knowledge to novel instances by relying on stimulus-
specific, not abstract, representations.
Experiment 4: Crossmodal Learning
Experiment 1 assesses crossmodal learning by presenting participants
with auditory tone sequences generated from one grammar and visual color
sequences generated from a second grammar. We then test participants using
novel grammatical stimuli from each grammar that are instantiated in one of
the vocabularies only (tones or colors), cross-balanced across participants. In
our scoring scheme, a null effect of learning (50% performance) can mean one
of two possibilities: 1) participants were unable to display adequate knowledge
of the statistical regularities; or 2) participants could learn the regularities but
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the knowledge exists in an amodal format that does not retain information
regarding the sense modality of the input. Accordingly, if performance levels
are significantly above chance, it shows that participants learned the statistical
regularities from both grammars in a modality-specific manner. In order to
compare dual-grammar learning to “standard” AGL learning performance, we
employed single-grammar, unimodal learning conditions as a baseline.
Method
Subjects. For Experiment 1, 40 participants (10 in each condition) were
recruited for extra credit from Cornell University undergraduate psychology
classes.
Materials. Two different finite-state grammars, Grammar A and
Grammar B (shown in Figure 4.1), were used to generate two sets of non-
overlapping stimuli (see Table 4.1). Each grammar had 9 grammatical
sequences used for the training phase and 10 grammatical sequences used for
the test phase, all sequences containing between three and nine elements. For
each participant, one grammar was instantiated as a color vocabulary, five
differently colored squares, and the other grammar was instantiated as an
auditory vocabulary, five pure tones. The five colored squares ranged along a
continuum from light blue to green, chosen such that each was perceptually
distinct yet similar enough to make a verbal coding strategy difficult. The five
tones had frequencies of 210, 245, 286, 333, and 389 Hz. These frequencies were
chosen because they neither conform to standard musical notes nor contain
standard musical intervals between them (see Conway & Christiansen, 2005).
As an example, for one participant, the Grammar A sequence “V-V-M” might
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be instantiated as two light green stimuli followed by a light blue stimulus,
whereas for another participant, this same sequence might be instantiated as
two 389 Hz tones followed by a 286 Hz tone.
All visual stimuli were presented in a serial format in the center of a
computer screen. Auditory stimuli were presented via headphones. Each
element (color or tone) of a particular sequence was presented for 500 ms with
100 ms occurring between elements. Each sequence was separated by 1700 ms
of blank screen.
Figure 4.1. Grammar A (top) and Grammar B (bottom) used in all three
experiments. The letters from each grammar were instantiated as colors or
tones (Experiment 4), colors or shapes (Experiment 5A), tones or nonwords
(Experiment 5B), two different shape sets (Experiment 6A), or two different
nonword sets (Experiment 6B).
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Table 4.1
Training and Test Items for Grammars A and B
                                                                                    
                        Grammar A               Grammar B    
Training VVM XXM
XMXM VTRM
XXRVM VVRXM
VTVTM XTTXM
XXRVTM XMRTRM
VTTVTM VRRTRM
XMMMXM XMRRTRM
XXRTTVM VRVRTXM
VTVTRVM VRRVRXM
                                                                                    
Test VTVM XTXM
VVTM VRTRM
XMMXM XTMTRM
VTTVM VRVRXM
VTTTVM VVRTXM
VVTRVM XMVRXM
VTTTVTM VRRRTRM
XXRTVTM XMVRTXM
XMXRTVM VVRTTXM
XMMXRVM XMRVRXM
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Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
conditions, two experimental and two baseline. Participants in the
experimental conditions were exposed to the training sequences from both
grammars, with one grammar instantiated as the color vocabulary and the
other as tones. Modality-grammar assignments were counter-balanced across
participants. Additionally, the particular assignment of letters to visual or
auditory elements within each grammar was randomly determined for each
participant.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told that they
would hear and/or see sequences of auditory and visual stimuli. They were
told that it was important to pay attention to the stimuli because afterward
they would be tested on what they observed. Importantly, the participants
were not explicitly told of the existence of the grammars, underlying rules, or
regularities of any kind. The 18 training sequences (9 from each grammar)
were presented randomly, one at a time, in six blocks, for a total of 108
sequences. Note that because the order of presentation was entirely random,
the visual and auditory sequences were completely intermixed with one
another. Figure 4.2 shows a schematic of a possible sample of the stimulus
presentation.
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Figure 4.2. Sample stimulus presentation for Experiment 4. Sequences
from the two grammars were interleaved randomly. For each participant, one
grammar was instantiated with the color vocabulary and the other grammar
instantiated with the tone vocabulary. The letters denote a particular color or
tone, depending on the grammar and vocabulary. The timing of the sequence
elements are shown, in milliseconds.
In the test phase, participants were instructed that the stimuli they had
observed were generated according to a complex set of rules that determined
the order of the stimulus elements within each sequence. Participants were told
they would now be exposed to a new set of color or tone sequences. Some of
these sequences would conform to the same set of rules as before, while the
others would be different. Their task was to judge which of the sequences
followed the same rules as before and which did not. For the test phase, 20
sequences were used, 10 that were grammatical with respect to one grammar
and 10 that were grammatical with respect to the other. For half of the
participants, these test sequences were instantiated using the color vocabulary
(Visual-Experimental condition), while for the other half, the test sequences
were instantiated using the tone vocabulary (Auditory-Experimental
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condition). For scoring purposes, test sequences from a particular grammar
that were instantiated in the same sense modality as in the training phase were
deemed “grammatical” whereas the sequences from the other grammar were
deemed “ungrammatical”. Thus, a classification judgment was scored as
correct if the sequence was correctly classified in relation to the sense modality
in question.
Participants in the baseline single-grammar conditions followed a
similar procedure except that they received training sequences from only one
of the grammars, instantiated in just one of the sense modalities, counter-
balanced across participants. The nine training sequences were presented
randomly in blocks of six for a total of 54 presentations. The baseline
participants were tested using the same test set as the experimental
participants, instantiated with the same vocabulary with which they were
trained on. Thus, the baseline conditions (Visual-Baseline and Auditory-
Baseline conditions) assess visual and auditory learning with one grammar
alone, in a way similar to the standard AGL design.
Results and Discussion
Table 4.2 reports mean correct classification scores (out of 20) for each
group as well as t-tests compared to chance levels. Each group’s overall
performance was better than would be expected by chance. Furthermore, we
compared each experimental group to its respective baseline group and found
no statistical differences: Visual-Experimental versus Visual-Baseline, t(9) = .22;
p = .83; Auditory-Experimental versus Auditory-Baseline, t(9) = 1.1; p = .30.
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Table 4.2
Experiment 4 Mean Performance and Tests of Significance versus Chance
                                                                                                                                    
Experimental (Dual-grammar)      Baseline (Single-grammar) 
Modality M % t(9) M % t(9)
                                                                                                                                    
Visual 12.7 63.5 2.76* 12.4 62.0 2.54*
Auditory 14.1 70.5 4.38** 13.1 65.5 3.44**
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Mean values reported out of 20 possible correct. T-tests are conducted
with respect to chance levels.
*p < .05. **p < .01
These results clearly show that participants can simultaneously learn
statistical regularities from input generated by two separate artificial
grammars, each instantiated in a different sense modality. Perhaps
surprisingly, the levels of performance in the dual-grammar experimental
conditions were no worse than those resulting from exposure to stimuli from
just one of the grammars alone. This lack of a learning decrement suggests that
learning of visual and auditory statistical structure occurs in parallel and
independently. Furthermore, these results stand in contrast to previous reports
showing transfer of learning in AGL between two different modalities (e.g.,
Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995). Our data essentially show a lack of transfer.
If our participants had exhibited transfer between the two sense modalities,
then all test sequences would have appeared grammatical to them, driving
their performance to chance levels (according to our scoring scheme). Thus,
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our data suggests that the knowledge of the statistical patterns, instead of
being amodal or abstract, was stimulus-specific.
We next ask whether learners can similarly learn from two different
statistical input streams that are within the same sense modality. In order to
provide the most optimal conditions for learning, we chose the two input
streams so that they would be as perceptually dissimilar as possible, using
colors and shapes (Experiment 5A) and tones and nonwords (Experiment 5B).
Experiment 5: Intramodal Learning Along Different Perceptual Dimensions
The purpose of Experiment 5 was to further explore the stimulus-
specific nature of statistical learning. Specifically, we assessed whether
participants can learn two sets of statistical regularities when they are
presented within the same sense modality but instantiated along two different
perceptual “dimensions.” Experiment 5A examines intramodal learning in the
visual modality while Experiment 5B examines auditory learning. For
Experiment 5A, one grammar was instantiated with colors and the other with
shapes. For Experiment 5B, one grammar was instantiated with tones and the
other with nonwords.
Method
Subjects. For Experiment 5, 60 additional participants (10 in each
condition) were recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 4.
Materials. Experiment 5 incorporated the same two grammars, training
and test sequences that were used in Experiment 4. Experiment 5A used two
visual vocabularies.  The first was the same set of colors used in Experiment 4;
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the second consisted of five abstract, geometric shapes. These shapes were
chosen to be perceptually distinct yet not amenable to a verbal coding strategy.
Experiment 5B used two auditory vocabularies. The first consisted of the same
set of tones used in Experiment 4; the second consisted of five different
nonwords, recorded as individual sound files spoken by a human speaker
(from Gomez, 2002): “vot,” “pel,” “dak,” “jic,” and “rud.”
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions,
two for Experiment 5A, two for Experiment 5B, and two new single-grammar
baseline conditions. The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. In
Experiment 5A, participants were trained on the two visual grammars and
then tested on their ability to classify novel sequences. For half of the
participants, these test sequences were instantiated using the color vocabulary
while for the other half they were instantiated using the shape vocabulary.
Likewise, in Experiment 5B, participants were trained on both auditory
grammars and then at test, half of the participants received all test sequences
as tones and the other half received all as nonwords.
The two new baseline conditions provided data for single-grammar
performance for the new shape and nonword vocabularies (note that we used
the same color and tone vocabulary baseline data from Experiment 4). In all
other respects, the procedure for Experiment 5 was the same as in Experiment
4.
Results and Discussion
Mean scores and t-tests compared to chance levels are shown in Table
4.3. Each group’s overall performance was better than expected by chance.
Furthermore, there was no statistical difference between the respective
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experimental and baseline groups: Colors-Experimental versus Colors-
Baseline, t(9) = -.42, p = .68; Shapes-Experimental versus Shapes-Baseline, t(9) =
-1.15, p = .28; Tones-Experimental versus Tones-Baseline, t(9) = .439, p = .67;
Nonwords-Experimental versus Nonwords-Baseline, t(9) = -.178, p = .86.
Table 4.3
Experiment 5 Mean Performance and Tests of Significance versus Chance
                                                                                                                                    
Experimental (Dual-grammar)      Baseline (Single-grammar) 
Dimension M % t(9) M % t(9)
                                                                                                                                    
Experiment 5A
Colors 11.9 59.5 2.97* 12.4 62.0 2.54*
Shapes 11.9 59.5 2.31* 13.2 66.0 3.44***
                                                                                                                                    
Experiment 5B
Tones 13.7 68.5 4.25** 13.1 65.5 3.44**
Nonwords 12.0 60.0 2.58* 12.2 61.0 3.44*
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Mean values reported out of 20 possible correct. T-tests are conducted
with respect to chance levels. The Colors-Baseline and Tones-Baseline are the
same data reported in Experiment 4 (called Visual-Baseline and Auditory-
Baseline).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
The results for Experiments 5A and 5B were similar to those of
Experiment 4. Participants were adept at learning two different sets of
statistical regularities simultaneously within the same sense modality, for
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shape and color sequences (Experiment 5A) and tone and nonword sequences
(Experiment 5B). Performance levels in these dual-grammar conditions were
no worse than learning levels with one grammar only. These results thus
suggest that participants can acquire statistical regularities from two streams of
information within the same sense modality, as long as the two streams differ
along a major perceptual dimension. Furthermore, these results suggest that
participants’ knowledge of the underlying statistical structure was stimulus-
specific rather than abstract.
We next look at dual-grammar learning within the same sense modality
when the vocabularies lie along the same perceptual dimension. That is, we
use two different sets of shapes and two different sets of nonwords.
Experiment 6: Intramodal Learning Within the Same Perceptual Dimension
The purpose of Experiment 6 was to test whether learners can learn two
sets of statistical regularities when they are presented along the same
perceptual “dimension” within the same sense modality. Experiment 6A
incorporated two different sets of visual shapes and Experiment 6B
incorporated two different sets of auditory nonwords.
Method
Subjects. For Experiment 6, 60 additional participants (10 in each
condition) were recruited.
Materials. Experiment 6 incorporated the same two grammars, training
and test sequences that were used in Experiments 4 and 5. Like the previous
experiments, the experimental conditions employed learning under dual-
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grammar conditions. Experiment 6A employed two visual vocabularies: Shape
Sets 1 and 2 (Figure 4.3). Shape Set 1 was the same set of shapes used in
Experiment 5A; Shape Set 2 was a new set of shapes similar in overall
appearance but perceptually distinct from set 1. Experiment 6B employed the
nonword vocabulary used in Experiment 5B as well as a new nonword set
consisting of “tood,” “jeen,” “gens,” “tam,” and “leb.”
Figure 4.3. Visual vocabularies used in Experiment 6A (Shape Set 1: top;
Shape Set 2: bottom).
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions,
two for Experiment 6A, two for Experiment 6B, and two new single-grammar
baseline conditions. The general procedure was identical to Experiment 5
except that different vocabularies were used. In Experiment 6A, one grammar
was instantiated as Shape Set 1 and the other grammar was instantiated as
Shape Set 2. At test, half of the participants were given the test sequences
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instantiated as Shape Set 1 and for the other half they were instantiated as
Shape Set 2. Similarly, participants in Experiment 6B were also trained on both
grammars, with one grammar being instantiated as Nonword Set 1 and the
other instantiated as Nonword Set 2. Half of these participants were tested on
the first nonword set and the other half were tested on the second nonword
set.
The two new baseline conditions provided data for single-grammar
performance for the new Shape Set 2 and Nonword Set 2 vocabularies (note
that we used the Shape Set 1 and Nonword Set 1 baseline data from
Experiment 5). In all other respects, the procedure for Experiment 6 was the
same as in Experiment 5.
Results and Discussion
Mean scores and t-tests compared to chance levels are shown in Table
4.4. When exposed to two different statistically-governed streams of visual
input, each with a distinct vocabulary of shapes, learners on average were only
able to learn the structure for one of the streams. This same result was also
found when learners were exposed to two different nonword auditory streams.
Thus, under dual-grammar conditions, learners showed above-chance
classification performance for only one of the vocabularies/grammars. As we
remarked earlier, chance level performance could be due to either an inability
to learn the underlying regularities or the result of having acquired these
regularities in terms of abstract representations that do not distinguish items
based on perceptual characteristics. Thus, the current data implies one of the
following: 1) dual-grammar statistical learning did not occur due to perceptual
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confusion of the stimuli; or 2) once learned, the knowledge of the two
grammars was co-mingled because the input elements were perceptually
similar. Either way, traditional, abstractive theories of AGL may have difficulty
accounting for such low-level, perceptual effects.
Table 4.4
Experiment 6 Mean Performance and Tests of Significance versus Chance
                                                                                                                                    
Experimental (Dual-grammar)      Baseline (Single-grammar) 
Dimension M % t(9) M % t(9)
                                                                                                                                    
Experiment 6A
Shapes1 12.0 60.0 2.58* 13.2 66.0 3.44***
Shapes2 11.2 56.0 1.65 11.6 58.0 2.95*
                                                                                                                                    
Experiment 6B
Nonwords1 10.9 54.5 1.49 12.2 61.0 3.44*
Nonwords2 12.4 62.0 6.47*** 13.3 66.5 3.79**
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Mean values reported out of 20 possible correct. T-tests are conducted
with respect to chance levels. The Shapes1-Baseline and Nonwords1-Baseline
are the same data reported in Experiment 5 as Shapes-Baseline and Nonwords-
Baseline.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Overall Analyses. To better quantify the differences in learning across the
three experiments, we submitted all data to a 4 X 2 X 2 ANOVA that
constrasted condition (crossmodal, intramodal-different dimension,
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intramodal-same dimension, or baseline), modality (visual versus auditory),
and grammar (Grammar A versus Grammar B). There was a main effect of
condition, F(3, 144) = 2.66; p = .050. There was a marginally significant main
effect of modality, F(1, 144) = 2.97; p = .087. There was no main effect of
grammar, F(1, 144) = 1.26; p = .264, nor were there any significant two-way
interactions (p’s >.4). There was a significant three-way interaction, however,
F(3, 144) = 2.59, p = .055, driven by better auditory-crossmodal learning for
Grammar A but better visual-crossmodal learning for Grammar B. The
marginal effect of modality is consistent with previous research showing that
auditory statistical learning of sequential input is generally superior to visual
(or tactile) learning (Conway & Christiansen, 2005).
Figure 4.4 shows the overall data collapsed across grammar and
modality. Post-hoc comparisons reveal that the mean performance for the
intramodal, same-dimension condition is significantly less than performance
on both the crossmodal (p < .01) and baseline (p < .05) conditions. Thus, this
outcome confirms that there was a learning decrement in Experiment 6 for
intramodal learning when the two grammars were composed of vocabularies
along the same perceptual dimension.
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Figure 4.4. Mean test performance (out of 20) for all three experiments:
Crossmodal (Experiment 4), Intramodal, different-dimension (Experiment 5),
Intramodal, same-dimension (Experiment 6), and Baseline, single-grammar
conditions (Experiments 4, 5, 6).
General Discussion
These experiments sought to determine the nature of acquired
knowledge underlying implicit statistical learning. We distinguished between
two possibilities. On the one hand, consistent with traditional information-
processing approaches, it is possible that people encode the underlying
structure of complex patterns in an amodal or abstract fashion. On the other
hand, embodiment theories propose that the mind represents concepts by
relying on modality-specific sensorimotor systems. Our data support the latter
view.
Experiment 4 showed that participants can learn statistical regularities
from two artificial grammars presented via two different input streams when
they occur in different sense modalities, one visually and the other aurally.
Furthermore, test performance under such dual-grammar conditions was
identical to baseline, single-grammar performance. This result suggests that
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not only was learning modality-specific, but that the underlying learning
systems operate in parallel and independently of one another. Experiments 5
and 6 extended these results, showing that learners can also learn regularities
from two input streams simultaneously within the same sense modality—as
long as the respective vocabularies differ along a major perceptual dimension.
Learning suffered when the vocabularies for each grammar were along the
same perceptual dimension, limiting statistical learning to just one of the two
input streams.
This modality-dependent view of statistical learning stands in contrast
to claims that learning in an AGL task may consist of modality-independent
representations (Altmann et al., 1995) or abstract “rules” (Marcus et al., 1999;
Reber, 1993). Some AGL studies purportedly show transfer effects across
modalities, suggesting that the underlying knowledge is abstract. However,
there has been considerable controversy surrounding the transfer data (e.g.,
Christiansen & Curtin, 1999; Marcus, 1999; Mathews, 1990; McClelland &
Plaut, 1999; Redington & Chater, 1996). For example, transfer may be achieved
by participants noticing the presence of low frequency illegal starting elements
in the transfer set, rather than by relying on abstract knowledge per se (Tunney
& Altmann, 1999). Or, participants may merely be recognizing certain patterns
of repeating elements (e.g., “BDCCCB”) and then recognizing the same
repetition patterns in items with a new vocabulary (e.g., “MTVVVM”; Brooks
& Vokey, 1991; Redington & Chater, 1996). Thus it is far from clear that transfer
effects reflect the operation of abstract knowledge acquired during the learning
task.
Though the current data point toward modality-specificity, it is possible
that human cognition relies on stimulus-specific representations for some tasks
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but abstract learning for others. For example, explicit problem-solving tasks
sometimes tap participants’ use of abstract principles (Goldstone & Sakamoto,
2003; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). The ability to learn abstract principles and
transfer them to new domains certainly appears to be a hallmark of explicit
cognition; it is much less clear, especially in light of the current data, whether
this is also true for implicit learning.
In addition to the evidence for modality-specificity, the data revealed,
quite remarkably, that participants can learn multiple, independent statistical
regularities simultaneously. This ability makes sense when one considers that
humans often attend to and process multiple, concurrent perceptual inputs at
the same time, especially across different sensory modalities.14 For example,
driving a car involves performing certain motor sequences as well as attending
to multiple visual, auditory, and haptic input patterns. It is likely that there is
an adaptive advantage for organisms to be able to encode statistical
regularities from multiple environmental input streams simultaneously.
Finally, these data speaks to the nature of the underlying cognitive
mechanisms of statistical learning. It is commonly believed that statistical
learning involves a single, unitary mechanism that operates over all types of
input (e.g., Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002). However, our data may
indicate that this view is inaccurate, or at least, incomplete. It is not clear how a
single, amodal mechanism could afford simultaneous learning of multiple
statistical regularities and keep the stimulus-specific representations
independent of one another (Experiments 4 and 5). Previous research has
suggested that although commonalities exist with statistical learning across
                                                 
14 For instance, people can better attend to rapidly-presented sequential stimuli when one
stream is auditory and the other is visual, compared to when both streams are in the same
modality (Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997).
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vision, audition, and touch, there also are important modality differences,
highlighting the possible operation of separate modality-constrained
subsystems (Conway & Christiansen, 2005). Such a view of statistical learning
resonates both with theories of implicit sequence learning (Goschke, 1998;
Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003) and implicit memory (Schacter,
Chiu, & Ochsner, 1993).
Implicit memory research in particular may offer insights into the
nature of statistical learning mechanisms. It appears likely that both implicit
statistical learning and perceptual priming are supported by something akin to
perceptual fluency (Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Kinder, Shanks, Cock, &
Tunney, 2003). Networks of neurons in modality-specific brain regions show
decreased activity when processing items that are the same or similar in overall
structure – possibly because of increased processing efficiency for that class of
stimuli (Reber, Stark, & Squire, 1998; Schacter & Badgaiyan, 2001). A
perceptual priming/fluency explanation for statistical learning is consistent
with the stimulus-specific learning we observed in the current experiments and
possibly offers an attractive possibility of unifying implicit learning and
implicit memory phenomena.
Much of perception and cognition involves the use of multiple sense
modalities to extract structure from temporal or spatiotemporal patterns. The
current experiments suggest that the knowledge underlying such implicit
statistical learning is closely tied to the sensory and perceptual features of the
material itself, perhaps indicating the involvement of multiple learning
subsystems, and challenging traditional abstractive and amodal theories of
cognition.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Summary and Discussion
The studies presented in this thesis provide groundwork for a
perceptual theory of implicit statistical learning. In contrast to traditional
perspectives on artificial grammar learning (AGL), these three studies
emphasize the importance of sense modality and stimulus characteristics in
learning. The data can be summarized with three main points regarding
implicit learning: 1) learning is affected by auditory-temporal and visual-
spatial constraints; 2) learning is affected by auditory-final, visual-initial, and
tactile-initial biases; 3) and learning is mediated by independent, stimulus-
specific representations. After considering each in turn, we present a
preliminary outline of a perceptual theory of implicit learning, supported in
part by drawing upon principles of perceptual learning. Finally, we propose a
rethinking of the standard “systems of memory” view, replacing it with a
modality-constrained view of cognition.
Auditory-Temporal and Visual-Spatial Constraints
One form of modality constraint observed in the experiments was the
presence of auditory-temporal and visual-spatial emphases in the processing
of complex patterns (Chapters 2, 3, 4). Consistent with previous research in
memory and perception, the data highlight the fact that audition and vision
are differentially adept at picking up information distributed in the
dimensions of time and space, respectively (Collier & Logan, 2000; Friedes,
1974; Kubovy, 1988; Mahar, Mackenzie, & McNicol, 1994; O’Connor &
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Hermelin, 1978; Penney, 1989). Although research had demonstrated that such
constraints affect the learning of fixed sequential patterns, (Handel & Buffardi,
1969), these constraints had not been investigated in the realm of statistical
learning. In Chapter 2 (Conway & Christiansen, 2005), we took measures to
ensure that the temporal/spatial constraints were not due merely to
differences in the ability for each sense modality to perceive the actual
stimulus elements. Thus, the observed effects appear to be influencing the
acquisition of the regularities existing among the relationships of elements,
rather than in detecting the individual elements themselves.
Because these temporal/spatial biases affect not just implicit statistical
learning but also a wide variety of other cognitive processes, this suggests the
presence of global constraints affecting processing within each sense modality.
In Chapter 3 we suggested that one possible cause could arise from the
differences in how stimulus energies are encoded across the senses. That is,
whereas the auditory system is organized tonotopically, the visual system is
organized retinotopically. Sound is a pressure wave that is represented at the
tympanic membrane as a one-dimensional temporal waveform.  Therefore, in
order to detect changes in the sound wave, the auditory system necessarily
must be sensitive to these temporal dynamics.  A visual image is a two-
dimensional spatially distributed pattern encoded by the retina and therefore
space is much more inherent in the processing of a visual image.  Likewise,
whereas the auditory system breaks down incoming sound waves into their
constituent frequency components, leading to a tonotopic organization in
auditory cortex, the visual system maintains a spatial/retinotopic organization
throughout. Thus, from very early on in the processing stream, differences in
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the way the stimulus energies are encoded likely affect all subsequent
processing done by each sense modality, including statistical learning.
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, explanation for the
auditory-temporal and visual-spatial biases is suggested by embodiment
theory. A.M. Glenberg (personal communication, February 23, 2005) proposed
that visual statistical learning might be mediated through eye movements. The
suggestion is that the underlying regularities are encoded by the ocular motor
system – as long as the regularities occur spatially. If the regularities exist not
in the dimension of space but instead in purely temporal patterns, as in
Chapter 3’s visual-temporal condition, then eye movements cannot participate
in learning and performance declines. This is an interesting hypothesis that
needs further empirical investigation.
Another possible explanation for the auditory-temporal and visual-
spatial biases, to be discussed later in the chapter, comes from perceptual
learning mechanisms. Next, we consider the second modality constraint that
was observed in the experiments.
Auditory-Final, Visual-Initial, and Tactile-Initial Biases
A second modality constraint was seen in that each sense modality was
especially attuned to extracting regularities from the initial or final parts of
stimuli (Chapters 2 & 3). That is, participants’ endorsements of novel items in
the test phase were more influenced by the fragment information contained in
final positions when the input was auditory, whereas endorsements for visual
or tactile material were more dependent upon fragment-initial information.
Nowhere else, to our knowledge, has such an effect been demonstrated in
AGL, statistical learning, or implicit learning more generally. Intriguingly,
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there is a similar effect seen in the shape of serial position curves in explicit
recall. It has long been known that a recency effect exists for auditory over
visual material; that is, people show better recall for auditory input compared
to visual input for the final one or two elements in a list (Crowder, 1986; Engle
& Mobley, 1976). More recently, evidence has revealed a visual primacy effect,
with recall better for visual material compared to auditory items for the first
few elements in a list (Beaman, 2002; Wright, 2002). Wright (2002) observed
the visual primacy effect in monkeys when recall was tested at relatively long
delays (10 seconds or more). Similarly, Beaman (2002) obtained the effect
when human participants were instructed to recall the second half of a list
before the first half. Thus, in both cases, it appears that the visual serial recall
advantage for initial items is seen only under conditions in which the recall
occurs after a substantial delay.
Likewise, the test phase in an AGL task occurs many minutes after
exposure to the first training stimulus. Thus, sensitivity to elements (or
fragments) in the initial positions of a visual sequence may only be measured
under appropriate test conditions. If so, then this suggests that common
processes may underlie, or constrain, learning and memory in both implicit
and explicit tasks. Finding common properties for the encoding of material
under implicit and explicit conditions may force a re-thinking of theories of
implicit (i.e., nondeclarative) and explicit (i.e., declarative) cognition. The most
accepted view is that implicit and explicit learning and memory are mediated
by entirely separate cognitive and neural systems, with different properties
characterizing each (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). It is too early to tell to what
extent the current data alters this standard view. There exist at least three
possibilities: the auditory-final, visual-initial, and tactile-initial biases in both
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implicit and explicit cognition may signify that both may be part of the same
memory system, relying on a single set of underlying mechanisms;
alternatively, there may be two separate systems that have common
properties. A third possibility is that “implicit” learning tasks tap explicit
processes. That is, participants may be explicitly recalling fragments of
elements from the training phase when classifying novel strings, in which case
recall of such fragments is constrained by serial position effects.
Independent, Stimulus-Specific Representations
In Chapter 4, we presented data showing that learning in AGL is
stimulus-specific rather than abstract or amodal. Furthermore, the acquired
knowledge existed independently for each sense modality or perceptual
dimension. That is, learners acquired the statistical regularities from two input
streams in parallel – either visually and auditorily or along two different
dimensions within the same modality – and the representations were not
confused with one another.
The issue of stimulus-specific versus abstract representations speaks to
the heart of theories of AGL as well as to the wider field of cognition. In terms
of cognition as a whole, our data is more consistent with an embodiment
approach (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997) rather than one that
compartmentalizes perceptual processing from amodal cognition (Fodor, 1975;
Pylyshyn, 1999). In terms of implicit learning specifically, it has been proposed
that the acquired knowledge consists of abstract, algebraic-like rules (Reber,
1993; Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999) because of data apparently
showing that participants can transfer their acquired knowledge across
different perceptual domains or modalities (e.g., Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Reber,
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1969; Tunney & Altmann, 2001). However, much of the transfer data can be
explained due to 1) not employing proper methodological controls; or 2) by
participants adopting explicit strategies during the test task to induce
mappings between vocabularies (Redington & Chater, 1996). Both possibilities
remove the need for postulating acquired abstract knowledge.
The data from Chapter 4 support a non-abstractive account of AGL,
with participants learning statistical structure specific to the sense modality or
perceptual dimension in which it occurred. If participants had been learning
the underlying abstract structure of the two input streams in our cross-over
design, then they should have exhibited chance level performance. Our results
show some conceptual consistency with an “exemplar-based” view of implicit
learning (Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Pothos & Bailey, 2000; Vokey & Brooks,
1992), which proposes that participants make classification judgments based
on overall similarity to observed training items, rather than knowledge of
underlying abstract rules.15
Not only were the acquired representations stimulus-specific, but they
appeared to exist separately and independently of one another. That is,
participants were exposed to two statistically-governed streams, and tested on
their ability to classify novel sequences. These novel sequences contained
exemplars from each of the two grammars, but all test items were instantiated
with one of the vocabularies only, counter-balanced across participants. The
fact that participants in Experiments 1 and 2 showed high performance levels
– statistically no different than single-grammar baseline conditions – means
                                                 
15 Because it has been established that AGL also consists of encoding the presence of chunks of
elements (i.e., fragments; Perruchet & Gallego, 1997; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; 1991), it is
likely that learning involves both exemplar and fragment-based processes, or a combination of
both.
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that they learned the two regularities in parallel, keeping each stimulus
domain separate from the other. For example, on average, learners classified a
visual stimulus as “legal” only if it matched the statistical regularities present
in the visual training items.
Several other cognitive theories are relevant to this issue of
independent, stimulus-specific representations. First, as mentioned in Chapter
3, Penney (1989) outlined a “separate streams” hypothesis in which verbal
short-term recall is mediated by modality-dependent processing streams, each
taking in different types of input as well as having different processing
capabilities. There are obvious similarities between Penney’s “separate
streams” and Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974; 1994; Baddeley, 1992)
multicomponent model of working memory, which also contains modality-
dependent processing loops. How the Penney/Baddeley account of short-term
memory relates to implicit statistical learning is discussed further below. It
will be suggested that both short-term memory and implicit learning operate
within a wider, modality-specific cognitive system.
Second, Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, and Heuer (2003) proposed a
neurocognitive model of sequence representation, based mainly on data from
the serial reaction-time task (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Their model includes
two separate pathways, dorsal and ventral, differing in neural structures, in
the type of input that is processed, and in access to awareness. In brief, the
dorsal stream is implicit and encodes unidimensional regularities whereas the
ventral stream is both implicit and explicit and can associate elements across
modalities or dimensions. The Keele et al. (2003) model, although based on
data from a different experimental paradigm, may be applicable to the
perceptual-based sequence learning explored in the current experiments.
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Specifically, Keele’s unidimensional “modules” may serve stimulus-specific
learning that was observed in this thesis. Furthermore, their description of the
multidimensional processing system lays the groundwork for exploring
implicit statistical learning that involves input occurring across different
perceptual modalities or dimensions. Keele et al. propose that learning cross-
modal or cross-dimensional patterns requires active attention and awareness.
Thus, this prediction can be explored within the context of perceptual
sequence learning using the AGL task.
Third, a popular view of implicit memory holds that it is composed of
separate, modality-specific subsystems, such as an auditory and a visual
perceptual representation system (Schacter, 1994). These subsystems mediate
priming phenomenon, in which people have a better ability to identify or
produce items following prior exposure to those items without conscious
recollection of the exposure (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). The modality-specific
subsystems are inferred based on evidence that priming is significantly
reduced when the modality or surface features are changed between study
and test (Schacter, 1987). Additionally, there appears to be very little
interaction between the visual and auditory priming subsystems (David &
Hirshman, 1998).  The existence of separate priming subsystems is also
supported by neuroimaging data showing decreased activity in modality-
specific brain areas during a priming task; for instance, within-modal visual
priming is accompanied by decreased activity in occipitotemporal extrastriate
cortical regions (Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer, 2004). As we suggested in
Chapter 4, something akin to perceptual priming may also support
classification tasks in implicit statistical learning. Some support for this view
comes both from behavioral (Chang & Knowlton, 2004; Kinder, Shanks, Cock,
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& Tunney, 2003) and neuroimaging studies (Reber, Stark, & Squire, 1998),
which emphasize the role of perceptual processing in implicit learning.
Implicit Learning as Perceptual Learning
To sum up so far, our data reveal three main points. Implicit statistical
learning shows: 1) auditory-temporal and visual-spatial biases; 2) auditory-
final, visual-initial, and tactile-initial biases; 3) evidence for independent,
stimulus-specific processing. We suggest that these modality-specific
constraints on statistical learning point toward the existence of separate
underlying learning mechanisms, each with different properties and
characteristics, and each having the ability to operate independently and in
parallel to one another.
Based on all of this evidence, we suggest that implicit statistical
learning arises from and is continuous with perceptual processing. Such a
view is consistent with embodiment theories (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997;
see also Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998) that argue that cognition as a whole is
supported by and made up of perceptual (and motor) mechanisms. This raises
the question, what exactly are the perceptual mechanisms that support
implicit statistical learning?  One possible mechanism already mentioned is
perceptual fluency (a.k.a. priming), in which perceptual processing becomes
increasingly efficient after exposure to particular items or item types.
Other insights regarding perceptual mechanisms may come from
perceptual learning phenomena. Perceptual learning involves changes to an
organism’s perceptual system so that it can respond better to its environment
(Goldstone, 1994). Superficially, there appear to be similarities between
perceptual learning and implicit learning. For instance, participants’ verbal
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reports in our experiments suggest that their perception of the stimuli has
changed after exposure to the training exemplars: participants often claim to
have made the test responses based on what “looked” or “sounded” right.
One hint of the relevance of perceptual learning to statistical learning comes
from Hall (1991),who suggested links between associative learning – which in
turn possibly mediates implicit learning (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer,
1998) -- and perceptual learning.  In fact, the Gibsons’ perceptual learning
approach (Gibson & Gibson, 1955) formed the basis for Reber’s (1967) first
study of implicit learning. Reber hypothesized that learning the regularities of
language-like structure may occur through something akin to the Gibsons’
idea of “differentiation,” where the learner becomes more sensitive to the
information inherent in the environment due to mere exposure to the relevant
stimuli. Aside from this early remark, there have been virtually no explicit
connections
made between implicit and perceptual learning.16 One exception is a recent
talk given at Cornell University (Goldstone, 2002) in which it was proposed
that statistical learning and perceptual learning both rely on the same
mechanisms. Below, I expand upon this idea, using the four perceptual
learning mechanisms outlined by Goldstone (1994): attentional weighting,
stimulus imprinting, differentiation, and unitization.
Attentional weighting
Attentional weighting modifies an organism’s attention, increasing it to
important perceptual dimensions or features or decreasing it to irrelevant
                                                 
16 It may be that Reber’s (1969) subsequent paper showing transfer of implicit learning
between different letter sets discouraged the notion that perceptual learning mechanisms are
synonymous with implicit learning. That is, if one believes that the transfer data point to
abstract knowledge, then it is difficult to see a role for perceptual learning.
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dimensions or features. Certain dimensions or stimulus features acquire
“distinctiveness” because they become important to the organism in some
way. Goldstone (1998) suggested that one example of attentional weighting is
categorical perception (Liberman et al., 1957), where between-category
features are emphasized over within-category features.
Attentional weighting may be the mechanism by which our learners
showed the auditory-final, visual-initial, and tactile-initial biases. An
attentional weighting account would suggest that organisms develop
(phylogenetically or ontogenetically) greater sensitivity for the beginning or
ending of input sequences in the different senses. It is not clear whether the
weighting is innate or has a developmental progression. Either way,
presumably these attentional biases would have developed because they
confer a functional advantage. Perhaps having different shaped serial position
curves is advantageous because where learning and memory for one sense
modality is strongest (auditory-final), the other senses are weakest (vision,
touch), and vice-versa (Wright, 2002).
An attentional weighting account might also explain the auditory-
temporal and visual-spatial differences. Perhaps organisms’ attention to the
dimensions of space and time change through exposure of the auditory and
visual world. That is, attention toward auditory-temporal and visual-spatial
information is increased, whereas attention to auditory-spatial and visual-
temporal information is decreased. This account differs from the account we
offered earlier which suggested these constraints might arise from the physical
make-up of the sensory systems. One way to distinguish between the two
accounts would be to explore whether young infants have these modality
constraints. If they do, it might imply that it occurs as a product of the
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physical architectures of the sensory systems as opposed to developing from
experience to sensory input.
Stimulus imprinting
Related to attentional weighting, stimulus imprinting refers to the
development of specialized functional “detectors” to detect important or
frequently repeating stimuli.17 Interestingly, Goldstone remarks that stimulus
imprinting may be the mechanism that explains implicit memory
phenomenon. In terms of implicit statistical learning, detectors could be
developed for whole stimuli (i.e., entire training sequences) or parts of stimuli
(i.e., frequently co-occurring elements), neatly coinciding with exemplar
(Vokey & Brooks, 1992) and fragment-based (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990)
theories of AGL According to Goldstone, the creation of fragment/part
detectors allows the organism to develop new “building blocks” for
representing stimuli, thus allowing for the flexible description of novel objects
and stimuli. In the case of statistical learning, these building blocks
correspond to frequently co-occurring elements (fragments or chunks),
allowing learners to generalize their knowledge to novel stimuli in an AGL
test task.
Unitization and Differentiation
Unitization is the mechanism by which a single perceptual chunk is
created out of separate stimulus elements that reliably co-occur.
Differentiation refers to the mechanism in which perceptual elements that had
originally been fused together become separated. As Goldstone (2002)
                                                 
17 Goldstone (1994) uses the term “detector” to refer to any abstract/cognitive device or
process.
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suggested, unitization and differentiation are likely candidates for implicit
statistical learning. Elements that reliably co-occur in AGL tasks can be
represented as chunks or fragments (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990). Similarly,
differentiation might help separate elements that weakly co-occur. These two
mechanisms thus are opposites but operate in concert. Elements that do not
occur together reliably become increasingly differentiated at the same time
that highly co-occurring elements become unitized.
One or all of these four mechanisms may underlie aspects of implicit
statistical learning. In comparing these mechanisms to posited theories of
AGL, a perceptual learning account differ from abstractive, rule-learning
theories but appears to share similarities with associative/fragment based
accounts (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 1998; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990)
as well as exemplar theories (Vokey & Brooks, 1992). Associative/fragment
accounts posit that frequently co-occurring elements are associated or
“chunked” together. This account shares obvious similarities with unitization,
for example. Exemplar models propose that whole items are encoded during
the training task and that test items are then compared with these stored
exemplars. Thus, something akin to stimulus imprinting appears similar to the
exemplar approach.
Despite the similarities, a perceptual learning account differs from
associative and exemplar theories because it posits that perception itself
changes. These changes presumably operate at a relatively “low” level in the
information stream, suggesting that the locus of learning may be in primary
sensory cortices (Fahle, 2002; Goldstone, 1998).
Taking all this into consideration, the groundwork is now in place for
constructing a perceptual theory of implicit statistical learning.
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Toward a Perceptual Theory of Implicit Learning (and Beyond)
Here we outline the beginnings of a perceptual theory of implicit
statistical learning. We begin by proposing four characteristics of statistical
learning.  We then place statistical learning within the wider context of
perception and cognition and go on to present a new way of thinking about
systems of perception, learning, and memory.
Given the evidence presented in this thesis, we propose that implicit
statistical learning has the following four characteristics.
1) Learning is mediated by multiple, modality-specific (visual, auditory,
tactile, etc.) mechanisms.
2) Each learning mechanism operates independently and potentially in
parallel with the others, although some interaction can occur.
3) Each learning mechanism has unique properties that constrain learning
(e.g., the auditory system specializes in handling temporal input and is
also biased to encode material in list-final positions).
4) Each mechanism operates using similar computational principles.
These principles may be a combination of those involved in implicit
memory (priming) and perceptual learning.18
A question that naturally follows is how do these modality-specific
implicit learning mechanisms relate to the rest of cognition. One prominent
view holds that learning, memory, and cognition can be subdivided into
multiple components, in a more or less hierarchical manner (Schacter &
                                                 
18 It will be necessary for future research to begin to distinguish between these alternate
mechanisms and the role they play in implicit statistical learning.
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Tulving, 1994; Squire & Zola, 1996). These components include working
memory, declarative memory, nondeclarative memory, priming, etc. (see
Figure 5.1). Some of these “systems” in turn contain modality-specific
subsystems. We propose an alternative way of depicting the components of
cognition that turns the standard view on its head. Instead of positing separate
memorial systems that are in turn composed of modality-specific subsystems,
we propose that cognition consists of separate sensorimotor cognitive systems,
each composed of a suite of inter-related perceptual, memorial, and cognitive
functions. This view recognizes the major, if not primary, role that perception
plays, and the continuous nature of perception with cognition and action
(Barsalou, 1999; Fuster, 1997; Lloyd, 2000; Mesulam, 1998).
The proposed cognitive architecture is organized by the primary sense
modalities.  Figure 5.2 shows the Visual, Auditory, and Tactile Cognitive
Systems. The purpose of each of these systems is to detect, encode, and
represent the immediate and past environment in order to prepare the
organism for future action.  Thus, each of these systems serve a number of
related processes, such as implicit memory, implicit learning, long-term
memory, and language. We hypothesize that these within-modality processes
rely upon and overlap with one another, rather than being discrete
mechanisms as is generally assumed.
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Figure 5.1. A prominent view of the systems of memory and cognition.
Adapted and modified from Squire and Zola (1996).
Note that in Figure 5.2, the outlines of each system are illustrated with
dashed lines, meant to imply that the boundaries are not sharp and rigid.
Thus, Fodorian “information encapsulation” (Fodor,1975) is not a
characteristic of this model. There is a large body of research demonstrating
crossmodal interactions in perception and cognition (e.g., Calvert, 2001; Driver
& Spence, 2000; McGurk & MacDonald, 1976; Meredith, 2002). The diagram
represents these interactions with the connecting arrows. The specific manner
and properties of such interactions are not within the scope of this thesis.
Likewise, a “multimodal” system or systems likely exist but are beyond the
scope of the current discussion.
Primary Memory
(Working or STM)
Secondary Memory
(LTM)
Declarative
(Explicit)
Nondeclarative
(Implicit)
Semantic Episodic
Procedural
Priming
Conditioning
Nonassociative
Learning
Statistical
Learning
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Figure 5.2. Proposed modality-constrained view of cognition. Each
perceptual/cognitive system is composed of a suite of inter-related
perceptual, memorial, and cognitive functions. The list of processes listed
within each system is not meant to be exhaustive. Also note that because this
thesis has been focused exclusively on the visual, auditory, and tactile
modalities, we exclude olfactory, taste, and motor cognitive systems from the
figure, while recognizing that they surely exist.
Each perceptual/cognitive system is proposed to have certain
modality-specific global constraints that affect all of its processes. In this way,
the model may help explain why the same modality constraints – e.g., visual-
spatial and auditory-temporal biases – are seen in apparently disparate
cognitive processes, including implicit learning, working memory, long-term
memory, and perception.
Below, we list and briefly describe some of the proposed functions that
each modality-constrained cognitive system might include.
Attention
Sensation
Perception
Implicit Memory
Perceptual Learning
Implicit Learning
Associative Learning
Working Memory
Concept Formation
Long-Term Memory
Language
Visual Cognitive
System
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Perception
Implicit Memory
Perceptual Learning
Implicit Learning
Associative Learning
Working Memory
Concept Formation
Long-Term Memory
Language
Auditory
Cognitive System
Attention
Sensation
Perception
Implicit Memory
Perceptual Learning
Implicit Learning
Associative Learning
Working Memory
Concept Formation
Long-Term Memory
Language
Tactile Cognitive
System
Multimodal Cognitive
System(s)?
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Attention
Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that attention has a
modality-specific component. That is, it is easier to attend to two stimuli
simultaneously when they occur in two different sense modalities rather than
in the same one (Duncan, Martens, & Ward, 1997; Treisman & Davies, 1973).
Furthermore, attention appears to be implemented neurally by a modality-
specific competition and suppression mechanism (Duncan, 1999). For
example, neurons corresponding to visual objects in visual cortex show
suppressed responses when the objects are being ignored, whereas attended
objects are strongly represented.  This evidence suggests that attention may
arise out of the workings of separate modality-specific cognitive systems.
Perceptual Representation
Borrowing from Schacter’s terminology (1994), we use the term
“perceptual representation” to refer to not just perception and implicit
memory (priming), but perceptual learning and implicit learning, as well. As
already discussed and outlined, we suggest that these four phenonema may
be variations of the same overall perceptual processing mechanisms.
Associative Learning
Associative learning has an intimate connection with implicit statistical
learning in that it appears to be a mechanism for uncovering environmental
regularities (Cleeremans et al., 1998; Ryder & Fovorov, 2001). However,
although associative learning has long been believed to be an important aspect
of learning and memory, it has mostly been considered unable to account for
perceptual learning phenomenon (Goldstone, 1998; though also see Hall, 1991
for an effort to unite associative and perceptual learning). Regardless,
associative learning is a core process in both cognitive and neural function
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(Hebb, 1949; Fuster, 1997). It seems likely that this learning process supports
perceptual and cognitive functions within and across each modality-specific
system. For instance, learning an association between two visual stimuli likely
involves links established between visual perceptual representations, whereas
learning an association between a visual and auditory stimulus necessitates
cross-modal links between the two systems.
Working Memory and Serial Recall
Working memory is commonly believed to consist of separate,
modality-specific processing streams, such as the phonological loop and
visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994; Penney, 1989).  These
modality-specific streams appear to be mediated by portions of the prefrontal
cortex that have corresponding links with the areas of the brain handling the
perception of phonological and visuospatial information (Goldman-Rakic,
1999). Thus, working memory appears to naturally arise out of perceptual
processes.
 Postulating working memory as arising out of modality-specific
perceptual processing dovetails nicely with MacDonald and Christiansen’s
(2002; Christiansen & MacDonald, 1999) proposal that working memory
emerges from interactions between experience and domain-specific processing
architectures. Thus, on the present account, there is not a separate working
memory resource; instead, it is the consequence of the functioning of each
modality-specific system.
Long-Term Memory, Concept Formation, and Language
Barsalou (1999) proposed that long-term memory and conceptual
knowledge are derived from the same neural and cognitive mechanisms
underlying perception. Simply, a perceptual state arises in modality-specific
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sensorimotor systems. These perceptual representations can then be stored in
long-term memory, retaining their perceptual characteristics. These modality-
specific “symbols” can then be merged and recombined dynamically to create
complex multimodal concepts that are less tied to direct perceptual
experience, though still grounded in it.
Likewise, Pulvermuller (2001) presented evidence that the brain
represents the meaning of words via functional “webs,” networks of neurons
distributed throughout the brain in regions corresponding to the perceptual
and motor properties of the word in question. Thus, words with strong visual
associations (i.e.,animal names) correspond to greater brain activity in
occipital cortex whereas words with strong action connotations (i.e., tool
names) result in greater activity in premotor cortex. This provides strong
evidence that meaning in language is represented in a modality-specific
manner.
Conclusion
This model offers a framework for unifying perception and cognition
while simultaneously reducing the number of various memorial systems that
have been proposed. It also suggests how different independent cognitive and
perceptual processes may be more functionally and mechanistically similar
than generally realized. In fact, areas that are traditionally entirely separate
research endeavors – such as implicit learning, implicit memory, and
perceptual learning – may be aspects of the same overall function.
This framework also offers novel predictions regarding cognition. For
instance, the processes within each modality-specific system ought to be very
closely related and dependent upon one another. Thus, it is predicted that
working memory and implicit learning, for example, which have seldom been
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investigated together, interact closely. Predictions such as this one are not
borne out if one takes the standard memory systems view (Figure 5.1).
In summary, this dissertation has presented evidence for modality
constraints affecting implicit statistical learning. We have suggested that these
modality differences arise from the operation of separate, modality-specific
cognitive systems, each with different processing constraints.  These modal
systems have a common purpose: to provide information regarding the
various sensory domains in order to prepare the organism for future action.
As such, these systems encompass the range of perceptual and cognitive
processes that are studied in human and non-human animals. Unanswered
questions remain, of course, such as to what extent these systems interact with
one another. But it is proposed that this modality-constrained account of
cognition may yield new insights into not only how organisms extract
structured information from the environment, but also into the very nature of
mind and behavior.
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